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ABSTRACT:
This article addresses large punitive damages awards that juries have granted to 
plaintiffs in recent cases against the tobacco industry, and demonstrates why such high 
awards are a warranted and necessary incentive for the companies to change their 
dangerous course of conduct. 
In State Farm v. Campbell, the United States Supreme Court announced that “few 
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages” will 
be constitutional.  In a subsequent smoking and health case brought against Philip Morris, 
however, a state appeals court allowed a punitive damages award that was almost 97 
times the compensatory damages award.  This decision was based on a finding that Philip 
Morris’s conduct was particularly reprehensible.  Furthermore, internal tobacco industry 
documents reveal that the industry knowingly has used its enormous wealth to make it 
exceedingly difficult for potential plaintiffs to find lawyers, and nearly impossible for 
those that do to maintain their cases.  The industry thus has been able to evade large 
judgments against it and to maintain its “refuse to settle” policy.
This article, therefore, proposes that when a smoking and health plaintiff is 
successful at trial, the tobacco industry should be subject to a high punitive damages 
award because: 1) the industry’s behavior is particularly reprehensible; 2) the industry 
has used its wealth to engage in litigation tactics that have allowed it to evade capture; 
and 3) a powerful financial sanction is needed to deter lethal misbehavior when the 
defendant makes billions of dollars addicting consumers to its deadly product.  
1
 Sara D. Guardino is a staff attorney at the Tobacco Control Resource Center at Northeastern University 
School of Law in Boston. This publication was made possible by Grant Number 1 R01 CA87571 from the 
National Cancer Institute.  Its contents are solely the authors’ responsibility, and do not necessarily 
represent the official views of the National Cancer Institute or National Institutes of Health. The authors 
thank Kelly Whelan and Patrick Taylor for their assistance.
2 Richard A. Daynard is Associate Dean and Professor of Law at Northeastern University School of Law in 
Boston and Chairman of the Tobacco Products Liability Project.
2“To paraphrase General Patton, the way we won these cases was not by spending all of 
Reynolds’ money, but by making that other son of a bitch spend all his.”
-R.J. Reynolds outside counsel J. Michael Jordan3
I. Introduction
The need to take measures to punish bad behavior and deter future wrongdoing 
long has been recognized.  Horace wrote: “Take away the danger and remove the 
restraint, and wayward nature runs free.”4  The recognition that punishments should fit 
their crimes is equally longstanding.  As Cicero proclaimed: “Let the punishment be 
proportionate to the offense,”5 a less literal version of the Book of Leviticus’ “eye for an 
eye.”6
Determining the appropriate level of damages that a court should award a plaintiff 
for a defendant’s wrongdoing is an issue that continues to this day.  While compensatory 
damages recompense a victim for his or her injuries, punitive damages are “generally 
defined as those damages assessed, in addition to compensatory damages, for the purpose 
of punishing the defendant for aggravated or outrageous misconduct and to deter the 
defendant and others from similar conduct in the future.”7  Because they are not based on 
3 See April 28, 1988 Memorandum from Mike Jordan to S&H attorneys, at
http://www.kazanlaw.com/verdicts/images/exb_d_sob.gif (last visited December 3, 2004) [hereinafter 
Jordan Memo].  See also Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F.Supp. 414, 421 (D.N.J. 1993) (citing this 
letter), discussed infra note 291.  See also Tobacco Documents Online, J. Michael “Mike” Jordan Profile, 
at http://tobaccodocuments.org/profiles/people/jordan_j_michael_mike.html (last visited December 3, 
2004) (describing Jordan’s role at R.J. Reynolds).
4 See Nonstop English, at http://www.nonstopenglish.com/reading/quotations/index.asp?search=wayward 
(last visited December 3, 2004) (attributing this quote to Horace); About.com, at
http://ancienthistory.about.com/library/bl/bl_horace.htm (last visited December 3, 2004) (identifying 
Horace as a Roman poet who lived from 65-8 B.C.).
5 See Webster’s Online Dictionary, at http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/definition/english/ 
pu/punishment.html (last visited December 3, 2004) (attributing this quote to Cicero); About.com, at
http://ancienthistory.about.com/library/bl/bl_time_philosophers.htm (last visited December 3, 2004) 
(identifying Cicero as a Roman statesman and philosopher who lived from 106-43 B.C.).
6 See Leviticus 24:20.
3the plaintiff’s actual loss, therefore, pinpointing the correct amount of punitive damages 
can be a difficult task.  
In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (“State Farm”),8 the United States 
Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of awarding substantial punitive damages.9
Although the Court suggested that punitive damages awards in excess of nine times the 
compensatory damages amount might not pass constitutional muster, it declined to 
establish a bright-line rule limiting the amount of punitive damages that a court may 
award based on the facts of any given case.  Nevertheless, some have argued that State 
Farm stands for the premise that, in all circumstances, a punitive damages award must be 
within a “single-digit ratio” to the compensatory award.  Courts subsequent to State 
Farm, however, have pointed out that the Supreme Court merely provided a guideline for 
punitive damages awards’ constitutionality, and that in certain circumstances, a punitive 
damages award may be far greater than nine times the compensatory damages amount.  
Furthermore, although the State Farm Court found the ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages to be a factor in determining a punitive damages award’s 
constitutionality, it held that the “most important indicium of the reasonableness of a 
punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.”10
This paper proposes, therefore, that where the defendant’s reprehensibility is particularly 
7
 Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers for Punitive Damages, 108 A.L.R. 
5th 343 (2004).
8 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
9
 Note that “[a] number of jurisdictions may have rules, regulations, constitutional provisions, or legislative 
enactments directly bearing on this subject.”  Shields, supra note 7.  
10 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419, quoting BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
4high – as is the case with the tobacco industry – a high ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages will withstand constitutional scrutiny.  
To conceptualize the reprehensibility factor, especially as it relates to the tobacco 
industry, this paper puts forth a new framework.  Under this framework, there are two 
types of reprehensibility in which the defendant may be found to have engaged: primary 
and secondary.  Primary reprehensibility concerns the reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
underlying conduct, i.e. the original wrongdoing that makes the defendant liable.  
Primary reprehensibility supports a court’s decision to award punitive damages to a 
plaintiff, and also is a significant factor in determining the proper amount of punitive 
damages.  Secondary reprehensibility involves the reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
“scorched earth” litigation tactics, which often result in the plaintiff’s inability to 
maintain an action against the defendant.  Secondary reprehensibility generally does not 
contribute to the court’s decision to award punitive damages; however, like primary 
reprehensibility, it is an essential part of the calculation of the appropriate amount of 
punitive damages.  Importantly, if the defendant uses its immense wealth to make 
litigating a case against it extremely difficult for plaintiffs, as the tobacco industry has 
done, this wealth can be a significant factor in determining the defendant’s secondary 
reprehensibility.  This paper thus proposes that because the tobacco industry’s 
reprehensibility – both primary and secondary – is particularly high, an award outside 
State Farm’s “single digit ratio” guideline not only is permitted, but also is necessary to 
punish the industry adequately for its wrongdoing and to deter it from such wrongdoing 
in the future.
5II. The Pre- State Farm Climate
To understand the reprehensibility framework that this paper proposes, a review 
of the significant United States Supreme Court jurisprudence that contributes to it is 
necessary.  The three major punitive damages cases that the United Stated Supreme Court 
considered leading up to its State Farm decision provide essential background.
A. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. (“TXO”),11 plaintiff TXO 
Production Corp. (“TXO”) sued Alliance Resources Corp. and others (together, the 
“defendants”), seeking declaratory judgment and to remove an alleged cloud on title to an 
interest in oil and gas development rights on a tract of land in West Virginia.  According 
to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, TXO “knowingly and intentionally
brought a frivolous declaratory judgment action against the appellees to clear a purported 
cloud on title”12 when its true intent was to use the purported title cloud as leverage for 
“increase[ing] its interest in the oil and gas rights.” 13 The defendants, therefore, 
counterclaimed against TXO, alleging slander of title.14
After a trial, the jury awarded the defendants/plaintiffs-in-counterclaim $19,000 
in actual damages and more than 526 times that amount – $10 million – in punitive 
damages.15  TXO moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for remittitur, 
arguing that the large punitive damages award violated the Due Process Clause of the 
11 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (plurality opinion).
12 Id. at 449, n. 5.
13 Id. at 449.
14 Id. at 447.
15 Id. at 451.
6United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.16  The court denied these motions; 
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the jury’s verdict as well.17  The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.18
In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Stevens,19 the Court began its analysis 
of “whether a particular award is so ‘grossly excessive’ as to violate the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” by quoting a passage from its 1991 decision in 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip (“Haslip”): “We need not, and indeed we 
cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the 
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case.  We can say, however, that [a] 
general concern of reasonableness . . . properly enter[s] into the constitutional calculus.”20
“[W]ith this concern for reasonableness in mind,” the Court turned to TXO’s argument.21
TXO argued that a punitive damages award should bear some relation to the 
compensatory damages award.22  The Court, however, reiterated its reluctance to adopt 
“an approach that concentrates entirely on the relationship between actual and punitive 
damages.”23  The Court found that when comparing punitive and compensatory damages, 
16 Id.
17 Id. at 452.
18 Id. at 453.
19
 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun joined Justice Stevens’ opinion, and Justice Kennedy 
joined in part.  Id. at 446.  Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part, and concurring in the 
judgment.  Id. at 466.  Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, filed an opinion concurring in the 
judgment.  Id. at 470.  Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice White and Justice Souter (in part), filed a 
dissenting opinion.  Id. at 472.
20 Id. at 458, quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 459.
23 Id. at 460.
7it is more “appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential harm that the 
defendant’s conduct would have caused to its intended victim if the wrongful plan had 
succeeded, as well as the possible harm to other victims that might have resulted if 
similar future behavior were not deterred.”24
In this case, the Court pointed out, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
had concluded that TXO’s behavior “could potentially cause millions of dollars in 
damages to other victims.”25  Additionally, TXO “was seeking a multimillion dollar 
reduction in its potential royalty obligation” by carrying out an “elaborate scheme.”26
The Court found that “when one consider[s] the potential loss to respondents . . . had 
petitioner succeeded in its illicit scheme,” the “shocking disparity between the punitive 
award and the compensatory award . . . dissipate[s].”27  Finding “the dramatic disparity 
between the actual damages and the punitive award” uncontrolling “in a case of this 
character,” and in light of “the amount of money potentially at stake, the bad faith of 
petitioner, the fact that the scheme employed in this case was part of a larger pattern of 
fraud, trickery, and deceit, and petitioner’s wealth,” the Court concluded it was “not 
persuaded that the [punitive damages] award was so ‘grossly excessive’ as to be beyond 
the power of the State to allow.”28  The Court, therefore, affirmed the West Virginia 
24 Id.
25 Id. at 453, quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 187 W. Va. 457, 476 (1992).
26 Id. at 461.
27 Id. at 462.
28 Id.
8Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision to allow the jury’s $10 million punitive damages 
award against TXO.29
B. BMW of North America v. Gore
The United States Supreme Court soon began to demonstrate that its “patience 
with runaway punitive verdicts was wearing thin.”30  In BMW of North. America, Inc.  v. 
Gore (“Gore”),31 the Court “ announced, for the first time and by a 5-4 vote, that a 
punitive damages award, even one that is the product of a fair trial, may be so large as to 
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.”32
The facts of Gore are as follows.  In 1990, Dr. Ira Gore, Jr. (“Gore”) bought a 
new BMW from an authorized dealer in Birmingham, Alabama for $40,750.88.33  After 
Gore drove the car for approximately nine months, he discovered that it had been 
repainted.34  Gore sued BMW of North America (“BMW”), the American distributor of 
BMW automobiles.35  Among other things, Gore alleged that BMW’s failure to disclose 
29 Id. at 466.
30
 Evan M. Tager, Punitive Damages After BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, at
http://library.lp.findlaw.com/articles/file/00108/002280/title/Subject/topic/Civil%20Rights_Section%20198
3/filename/civilrights_2_1433 (last visited December 3, 2004).  Mr. Tager represented BMW in BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore along with his partner, Andrew L. Frey, who argued the case.  Id.
31 BMW of N. Am., Inc.  v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
32 BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 509 (Ala. 1997) (on remand from the United States Supreme 
Court).
33 Gore, 517 U.S. at 563.
34 Id.
35 Id.  Gore also named BMW’s German manufacturer and the Birmingham dealership as defendants.  Id. at 
n. 2.
9the repainting “constituted a suppression of material fact.”36  He asked for $500,000 in 
compensatory and punitive damages, plus costs.37
At trial, BMW admitted that in 1983, it had adopted a nationwide policy of selling 
cars as new if the cost of repairing damage caused in the course of manufacturing or 
transportation did not exceed three percent of the retail price.38  Under this policy, the 
dealer was not informed if any repairs had been made.39  Although the paint on Gore’s 
car had been damaged during transit,40 the repainting cost only $601.37 – about 1.5 
percent of the suggested retail price.41  Hence, BMW did not disclose the damage or 
repair to the dealer or, in turn, to Gore.42
Relying on a former BMW dealer’s testimony, Gore asserted at trial that his 
repainted car was worth $4,000 less than a similar car that had not been repainted.43  In 
support of his punitive damages claim, Gore introduced evidence that since enacting the 
policy in 1983, BMW “had sold 983 refinished cars as new, including 14 in Alabama, 
without disclosing that the cars had been repainted . . . .”44   Using his own $4,000 
damage estimate, Gore argued that a $4 million punitive damages award “would provide 
36 Id. at 563.
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 563-564.
39 Id. at 564.
40
 “The parties presumed that the damage was caused by exposure to acid rain during transit between the 
manufacturing plant in Germany and the preparation center.”  Id. at 563, n. 1.
41 Id. at 564.
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
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an appropriate penalty for selling approximately 1,000 cars for more than they were 
worth.”45  In defense, BMW argued it was under no obligation to disclose the minor 
damage and repainting, and that this “good-faith belief made a punitive award 
inappropriate.”46  It also argued that car sales outside Alabama were not relevant to 
Gore’s claim.47
The jury found BMW liable and awarded Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages 
as well as $4 million in punitive damages.48   It based the latter “on a determination that 
the nondisclosure policy constituted ‘gross, oppressive or malicious’ fraud.”49  BMW 
moved to set aside the punitive damages award.50  After the trial judge denied this 
motion, BMW appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which also rejected BMW’s 
claim that the award was constitutionally impermissible.51  It did, however, find that “the 
jury improperly computed the amount of punitive damages by multiplying Dr. Gore’s 
compensatory damages by the number of sales in other jurisdictions.”52  Based on this 
finding, the court reduced the punitive damages award to $2 million.53  The United States 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id.
48 Id. at 565.  The jury also found the dealership liable for compensatory damages and the German 
manufacturer liable for both compensatory and punitive damages.  Id. at n. 6.  The dealership did not 
appeal the judgment; the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the judgment against the German manufacturer, 
holding that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over it.  Id.
49 Id. at 565.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 566.
52 Id. at 567.
53 Id. 
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Supreme Court then granted certiorari, “believ[ing] that a review of this case would help 
to illuminate the character of the standard that will identify unconstitutionally excessive 
awards of punitive damages.”54
In a 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Stevens,55 the Court stressed that 
“[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that 
a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, 
but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”56  In keeping with this 
principle, the Court set down three “guideposts” for courts to consider when reviewing 
punitive damages awards:
(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
misconduct; 
(2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm 
suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages 
award; and 
(3) the difference between the punitive damages 
awarded by the jury and the civil penalties 
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.57
The Court stated that the first guidepost, the degree of reprehensibility, is 
“perhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award 
. . . .”
58
  In this case, the Court found that “none of the aggravating factors associated with 
54 Id. at 568 (internal quotation omitted).
55
 Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer joined Justice Stevens’ opinion.  Id. at 561.  Justice 
Breyer filed a concurring opinion, which Justices O’Connor and Souter joined.  Id.  Justice Scalia, joined 
by Justice Thomas, filed a dissenting opinion.  Id. at 598.  Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, filed a separate dissenting opinion.  Id. at 607.
56 Id. at 574.
57 Id. at 574-75.
58 Id. at 575.
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particularly reprehensible conduct is present.”59  It cited factors such as the “purely 
economic” nature of the harm, and that “BMW’ s conduct evinced no indifference to or 
reckless disregard for the health and safety of others.”60  Because, in the Court’s view, the 
case “exhibit[ed] none of the circumstances ordinarily associated with egregiously 
improper conduct,” it found the $2 million punitive damages award unwarranted.61
The Court then examined the second guidepost – a punitive damages award’s 
“ratio to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff.”62  As in TXO, it began by recognizing 
that although “[t]he principle that exemplary damages must bear a ‘reasonable 
relationship’ to compensatory damages has a long pedigree,”63 the Court has 
“consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple 
mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages to the 
punitive award.”64  Unlike TXO, however, in this case the Court felt that the 
“breathtaking 500 to 1” ratio “must surely raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow. ”65
59 Id. at 576.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 580.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 582.
65 Id. at 583.
The Court also examined the third guidepost – a comparison of “the punitive damages award and the 
civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct.”  Id.  This factor springs from 
the premise that “a reviewing court engaged in determining whether an award of punitive damages is 
excessive should accord substantial deference to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanction for 
the conduct at issue.”  Id. (internal quotation omitted).  The Court noted that Alabama’s maximum civil 
penalty for violation of its Deceptive Trade Practice act is $2,000; it cited other state statutes that impose 
both higher and lower sanctions.   Id. at 584. The Court found that “[n]one of these statutes would provide 
13
In light of the above, the Court concluded that the $2 million sanction could not 
be justified as “necessary to deter future misconduct without considering whether less 
drastic remedies could be expected to achieve that goal.”66  Although, again, it was “not 
prepared to draw a bright line marking the limits of a constitutionally acceptable punitive 
damages award,” the Court was “fully convinced that the grossly excessive award 
imposed in this case transcends the constitutional limit.”67  The Court thus reversed the 
judgment, and remanded the case to the Alabama Supreme Court to determine a more 
appropriate award or to order a new trial.68
On remand, the Alabama Supreme Court interpreted the Supreme Court’s opinion 
to require notice to a defendant not only of “conduct that may subject him to 
punishment,” but also of “the severity of the penalty that a state may impose for such 
conduct.”69  After re-examining the case’s facts in light of the Supreme Court’s three 
guideposts, the court “agreed that the $2 million award of punitive damages against 
BMW was grossly excessive.”70  It affirmed the trial court’s denial of BMW’s motion for 
a new trial, conditioned on Gore filing a “remittitur of damages to the sum of $50,000”
with the court within 21 days. 71
an out-of-state distributor with fair notice that the first violation – or, indeed, the first 14 violations – of its 
provisions might subject an offender to a multimillion dollar penalty.”  Id.
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 585-586.
68 Id. at 586.
69 BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 509 (Ala. 1997).
70 Id. at 515.
71 Id.  Remittitur is “1. An order awarding a new trial, or a damages amount lower than that awarded by the 
jury, and requiring the plaintiff to choose between those alternatives . . . .  2. The process by which a court 
requires either that the case be retried, or that the damages awarded by the jury be reduced.” BLACK’S LAW 
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C. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group
The Supreme Court continued to put the brakes on high punitive damages awards 
in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group (“Cooper Industries”) .72  In the 
1980s, Leatherman Tool Group (“Leatherman”) designed a device called the Pocket 
Survival Tool (“PST”), which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit described as an 
“ingenious multi-function pocket tool which improves on the classic ‘Swiss army knife’
in a number of respects.”73  In 1996, Cooper Industries, Inc. (“Cooper”) planned to design 
and manufacture a tool with the PST’s basic features, with new features added, under the 
name “ToolZall.” 74  A dispute arose between Leatherman and Cooper after Cooper used a 
modified PST in its photographs advertising the ToolZall at a Chicago hardware show.75
Cooper also used the photographs in marketing materials and catalogues nationwide.76
Leatherman sued Cooper, “asserting claims of trade-dress infringement, unfair 
competition, and false advertising . . . .”77  After a trial, the jury “found Cooper guilty of 
passing off, false advertising, and unfair competition and assessed aggregate damages of 
$50,000 on those claims.”78  Furthermore, finding that “Cooper acted with malice, or 
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  By requiring Gore’s remittitur, the court essentially reduced the punitive 
damages award to $50,000.
72 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
73 Id. at 427, quoting Leatherman Tool Group v. Cooper Indus., 199 F.3d 1009, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 427-428.  According to the Court, “A Cooper employee created a ToolZall ‘mock-up’ by grinding 
the Leatherman trademark from handles of pliers of a PST . . . .”  Id. at 428.  At least one of the alleged 
ToolZall photographs “was retouched to remove a curved indentation where the Leatherman trademark had 
been.  Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 429.
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showed a reckless and outrageous indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm,” the 
jury awarded Leatherman $4.5 million in punitive damages – 90 times the compensatory 
damages amount.79  The court rejected Cooper’s argument “that the punitive damages 
were ‘grossly excessive’ under . . . [Gore],” and entered judgment.80  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the punitive damages award in an 
unpublished opinion.81
The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari “to resolve confusion 
among the Courts of Appeals” as to the correct standard to use in reviewing a district 
court’s determination of a punitive damages award’s constitutionality.82  After 
determining that the courts of appeal should apply a de novo review standard,83 the Court 
vacated the judgment and remanded the case for review under that standard.84
On remand, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the jury’ s original punitive 
damages award “only somewhat less ‘breathtaking’ than that invalidated by the Supreme 
Court in Gore.”85  The court found “that there is insufficient evidence in the record with 
respect to the harm or potential harm caused by Cooper’s conduct to support the punitive 
79 Id. 
80 Id.  The court ordered that “60% of the punitive damages would be paid to the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Account of the State of Oregon.”  Id.
81 Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 205 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1999) (Table).
82 Id. at 424 (2001).  Cooper’s petition for a writ of certiorari also asked the Court to decide “whether the 
award violated the criteria . . . articulated in Gore.”  Id. at 431.
83 Id. at 436.
84 Id. at 443.
85 Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 285 F. 3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002).
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damages award.”86  Additionally, finding Cooper’s conduct “more foolish than 
reprehensible,” the court concluded that “application of the first Gore  factor 
[(reprehensibility)] does not support the jury’s award.”87
Despite the above, the court stated its belief “that the conduct at issue warrants a 
sanction that is not trivial, but also is not disproportionate to the harm caused or 
threatened.”88  It also addressed the District Court’s consideration of Cooper’s corporate 
wealth “in finding that the amount of the punitive damages award was necessary to deter 
Cooper from similar conduct in the future.”89  The court noted that although “[t]he 
potential deterrent effect of a punitive damages award is not mentioned expressly in the 
Gore criteria, . . . it has continued to be considered in post-Gore cases.” 90  The court thus 
“acknowledge[d] that a substantial punitive award might be necessary to have a sufficient 
economic effect on Cooper to create deterrence.”91  Although it found the original $4.5 
million award unconstitutional, it awarded Leatherman $500,000 – 10 times the $50,000 
compensatory damages amount.92
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1151.
88 Id. at 1152.
89 Id. at 1151.
90 Id. at 1152.
91 Id.
92 Id.
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III. State Farm v. Campbell
A. The Supreme Court’s Opinion
In State Farm,93 the Supreme Court again refused to articulate a bright-line rule 
for the amount of punitive damages.  Nevertheless, the Court overturned a punitive 
damages award of $145 million where the compensatory damages award was $1 million.  
The facts of the case are as follows.  In 1981, while driving with his wife in Cache 
County, Utah, Curtis Campbell (“Campbell”) attempted to pass six vans traveling in front 
of him on a two-lane highway.94  Todd Ospital, who was approaching in his vehicle from 
the opposite direction, swerved to avoid hitting Campbell’s oncoming automobile head-
on.95  In doing so, Ospital lost control of his car, and collided with a vehicle driven by 
Robert Slusher (“Slusher”).96  Ospital was killed, and Slusher was permanently disabled.  
Campbell and his wife were unharmed.97  Ospital’s estate (“Ospital”) and Slusher 
subsequently sued Campbell for wrongful death.98
Investigators and witnesses agreed that Campbell had caused the crash.99
Campbell’s insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (“State Farm”), 
decided nevertheless to decline settlement offers for the $50,000 policy limit, and opted 
93 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
94 Id. at 412.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 412-13.
97 Id. at 413.
98 Id.
99 Id.
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to take the case to trial against its own investigators’ advice.100  State Farm “assur[ed] the 
Campbells that ‘their assets were safe, that they had no liability for the accident, that 
[State Farm] would represent their interests, and that they did not need to procure 
separate counsel.’”101  A jury, however, found Campbell 100 percent at fault, and 
returned a judgment against him for $185,849, which was $135,849 more than the 
settlement offer.102
State Farm, at first, refused to cover the excess liability.103  Its counsel told the 
Campbells: “You may want to put for sale signs on your property to get things 
moving.”104  State Farm also was unwilling to post a bond to alow Campbell to appeal 
the judgment against him.105  Campbell, therefore, had to obtain his own counsel to 
appeal the verdict.106  While the appeal was pending, the Campbells entered into an 
agreement with Slusher and Ospital whereby Slusher and Ospital agreed not to seek 
satisfaction of their judgment against the Campbells in exchange for the Campbells’
agreement “to pursue a bad faith action against State Farm and to be respresented by 
Slusher’s and Ospital’s attorneys.”107  Under the agreement, Slusher and Ospital would 
receive 90 percent of any verdict against State Farm.108
100 Id. 
101 Id., quoting Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1142 (Utah 2001).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. 
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The Utah Supreme Court denied Campbell’s appeal of the wrongful death action 
in 1998, and State Farm ultimately paid the entire judgment.109  The Campbells then sued 
State Farm, alleging bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in 
connection with State Farm’s actions following the accident.110  After the first phase of a 
bifurcated trial, the jury found that State Farm’s refusal to settle the case for $50,000 
“was unreasonable because there was a substantial likelihood of an excess verdict.”111
The second phase of the State Farm trial addressed the fraud and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress charges, as well as compensatory and punitive 
damages.112  At this phase, the Campbells rebutted State Farm’s assertion that “its 
decision to take the case to trial was an ‘honest mistake’ that did not warrant punitive 
damages” by introducing evidence that State’s Farm’s refusal to settle was “a result of a 
national scheme to meet corporate fiscal goals by capping payout on claims company 
wide.”113  This evidence included “extensive expert testimony regarding fraudulent 
practices by State Farm in its nation-wide operations.” 114
108 Id. at 414.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.  Before the trial’s second phase began, the Court decided Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).  See id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 414-415.
114 Id. at 415.  Prior to phase two of the trial, State Farm had moved to exclude this evidence, and continued 
its objection at trial; the Court, however, ruled this evidence was admissible to determine whether State 
Farm’s conduct “was indeed intentional and sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages.”  Id.
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The jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 
million in punitive damages.115  After the trial court reduced these amounts to $1 million 
and $25 million, respectively, both parties appealed.116
Relying largely on the evidence presented regarding State Farm’s alleged scheme 
to cap payouts, “the [Utah Supreme Court] concluded State Farm’s conduct was 
reprehensible.”117  The court, additionally, “relied upon State Farm’s ‘massive wealth’
and on testimony indicating that ‘State Farm’s actions, because of their clandestine 
nature, will be punished at most in one out of every 50,000 cases as a matter of statistical 
probability . . . .’”118  Concluding that “the ratio between punitive and compensatory 
damages was not unwarranted,” the court reinstated the $145 million punitive damages 
award.119  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.120
As it had done in Cooper, the Court began its analysis by recognizing that 
compensatory damages and punitive damages serve different functions.121  While 
compensatory damages are intended to redress a plaintiff’s concrete loss, the Court noted, 
punitive damages “serve a broader function; they are aimed at deterrence and 
retribution.”122  The Court recognized, however, that because the Fourteenth 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id.
118 Id., quoting Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d at 1134, 1153 (Utah Supr. Ct. 2001).
119 Id. at 415-416.
120 Id. at 416.
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
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Amendment’s Due Process Clause “prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or 
arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor,” there are procedural and substantive constitutional 
limits on punitive damages awards – despite the States’ discretion over their 
imposition.123
The Court then examined the Gore “guideposts” – starting with the “most 
important indicium of a punitive damages award’s reasonableness,” the degree of 
reprehensibility of State Farm’s conduct.124  The Court stated that in determining 
reprehensibility, courts should consider whether:
[1.] the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; 
[2.] the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a 
reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; 
[3.] the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; 
[4.] the conduct involved repeated actions or was an 
isolated incident; and
[5.] the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, 
or deceit, or mere accident.125
Although the Court noted that “State Farm’s handling of the claims against the 
Campbells merits no praise,” it found that a “more modest punishment for this 
reprehensible conduct could have satisfied the State’s legitimate objectives, and the Utah 
courts should have gone no further.”126
123 Id.  According to the Court, this is because “[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our 
constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject 
him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”  Id. at 417, quoting 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996).
124 Id. at 419.  The Court noted that it had “reiterated the importance of these three guideposts in Cooper 
Industries . . . .” Id. at 418.
125 Id. at 419, citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576-577.
126 Id. at 419-420.
22
The Court then turned to the second Gore guidepost – the disparity between the 
actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award.127  The 
Court began by reiterating that it has “been reluctant to identify concrete constitutional 
limits on the ratio between harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive 
damages award,”128 and “decline[d] again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive 
damages award cannot exceed.”129  The Court cautioned, however, that “in practice, few 
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a 
significant degree, will satisfy due process” and noted its previous conclusion in Haslip
that “an award of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be 
close to the line of constitutional impropriety.” 130 Single-digit multipliers, the Court 
stated, “are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the State’s 
goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios in the range of 500 to 1 . . . 
.”
131
The Court, therefore, did not set down a benchmark for punitive damages awards.  
Although it noted that “courts must ensure that the measure of punishment is both 
reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general 
damages recovered,” the Court stressed that “[t]he precise award in any case, of course, 
must be based upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm 
127 Id. at 424.
128 Id. at 424-425, quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 (“we have consistently rejected the notion that the 
constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and 
potential damages to the punitive award).
129 Id. at 425.
130 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S at 425, citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 
U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991).
131 Id., citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 582-83.
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to the plaintiff.”132  Importantly, the Court distinguished the facts of State Farm from 
cases involving physical harm, finding that in this case,
[t]he harm arose from a transaction in the economic realm, 
not from some physical assault or trauma; there were no 
physical injuries; and State Farm paid the excess verdict 
before the complaint was filed, so the Campbells suffered 
only minor economic injuries for the 18-month period in 
which State Farm refused to resolve the claim against 
them.133
The Court found, moreover, that “[m]uch of the distress was caused by the 
outrage and humiliation the Campbells suffered at the actions of [State Farm]; and it is a 
major role of punitive damages to condemn such conduct.  Compensatory damages, 
however, already contain this punitive element.”134  Under these circumstances, therefore, 
the Court had “no doubt that there is a presumption against an award that has a 145-to-1 
ratio.”135
The Court noted that the lower court’s justifications for the large punitive 
damages award – “the fact that State Farm will only be punished in one out of every 
50,000 cases as a matter of statistical probability” and “State Farm’s enormous wealth” –
were “arguments that seek to defend a departure from well-established constraints on 
punitive damages.”136  In this case, however, the Court found these arguments “had little 
to do with the actual harm sustained by the Campbells.”137 Nonetheless, the Court noted
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 426.
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 426-427.
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that inflating punitive damages awards based on the defendant’s wealth is neither 
“unlawful [n]or inappropriate” as long as the award is otherwise constitutional.138
Having applied the Gore guideposts,139 the Court concluded that a punitive 
damages award “at or near the amount of compensatory damages” likely was justified 
under the circumstances of this case.140  The $145 million award, the Court held, “was 
neither reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong committed, and it was an irrational and 
arbitrary deprivation of the property of the defendant.”141  The Court remanded the case 
to the Utah Supreme Court “for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”142
B. On Remand to the Utah Supreme Court
On remand, the Utah Supreme Court was visibly critical of the Supreme Court, 
and found “the blameworthiness of State Farm’s behavior toward the Campbells to be 
several degrees more offensive than the Supreme Court’s less than condemnatory view 
that State Farm’s behavior ‘merits no praise.’”143
The court pointed out that the Supreme Court had “declined . . . to fix a substitute 
award, choosing instead to entrust to our judgment the calculation of a punitive award 
which both achieves the legitimate objectives of punitive damages and meets the 
137 Id. at 427.
138 Id. at 427-28.
139
 As to the third Gore guidepost – the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and 
the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases – the Court stated that the most relevant civil 
sanction in Utah (a $10,000 fine for an act of fraud) is “dwarfed by the $145 million punitive damages 
award.”  Id. at 428.
140 Id. at 429.
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 98 P.3d 409, 412 (Utah 2004).
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demands of due process.”144  The court felt that there was a “logical underpinning to an 
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s remand order which sanctions and expects us to 
exercise a considerable measure of independent judgment in fixing the punitive damages 
award.”145
Although the court reduced the $145 million punitive damages award to just over 
$9 million,146 this award was nine times the $1 million compensatory award – the highest 
ratio the court could have awarded within the “single-digit ratio” between punitive and 
compensatory damages that the Supreme Court had described.  
C. State Farm’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Denied
State Farm subsequently petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari.  According to the respondents’ brief, State Farm’s petition “focus[ed] on this 
Court’s comment in [State Farm] that ‘[a]n application of the Gore guideposts to the facts 
of this case, especially in light of the substantial compensatory damages awarded . . . 
likely would justify a punitive damages award at or near the amount of compensatory 
damages.’”147 The brief continued:
However, the quoted language is a prediction (“likely 
would justify”), not a holding or a directive. . . . State Farm 
improperly seeks to recast the language of the mandate in 
[State Farm ] from that of constrained guidance to that of 
ministerial directive. State Farm’s interpretation conflicts 
with this Court’s customary practice, which is to announce 
the governing legal standard and remand to the appropriate 
144 Id. at 411.
145 Id. at 412.  The court looked, specifically, to “certain themes” in State Farm and Gore to support its 
conclusion that “punitive damages are properly the province of the states.”  Id.
146
 Specifically, the award was $9,018,780.75.  Id. at 419.
147 See Brief in Opposition to a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 2004 WL 1907049 (U.S. August 23, 
2004), quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 429.
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lower court for application of that standard to the facts of 
the particular case, and not to employ the lower court as a 
mere calculator or scribe.148
The Supreme Court apparently agreed with the respondents, and denied State 
Farm’s petition on October 4, 2004.149
IV. The Tobacco Industry’s Primary Reprehensibility
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in State Farm, analysis of the proper 
ratio between the punitive and compensatory damages awards “has taken on a life of its 
own.” 150  Appeals court reductions of juries’ punitive damages awards have occurred at a 
staggering pace, “irrespective of the reprehensibility of the defendants’ conduct.”151
While defendants claim that State Farm limits punitive damages to within a single-digit 
multiplier of compensatory damages, plaintiffs point to the State Farm Court’s 
proclamation that no such benchmark exists.  As one commentator put it, “Supreme 
Court opinions are a bit like the Bible; one can find passages in them to support just 
about any proposition, and revelations to serve for many purposes.”152
The fact remains that although “State Farm . . . has been characterized as a 
categorical limitation on punitive damages awards,” the State Farm Court pointed out 
that “every assessment of punitive damages is circumstantial.”153  Additionally, the State 
Farm Court noted only that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive 
148 Id.
149 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 125 S. Ct. 114 (2004) (mem.).
150
 3 ATLA’s Litigating Tort Cases § 28:34 (2004).
151 Id.
152
 Elizabeth Cabraser, The Effect of State Farm v. Campbell on Punitive Damages in Mass Torts and Class 
Action Litigation: What Does The Immediate Post-State Farm Jurisprudence Reveal?, SJ035 ALI-ABA 
1163 (2004).
153 Id.
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damages and compensatory damages . . . will satisfy due process,”154 thus implying that 
in exceptional cases, higher ratios are permissible.
Smoking and health actions against the tobacco industry represent such 
exceptional cases.  Since State Farm, many courts have considered the tobacco industry’s 
primary reprehensibility and the significant role that it – and not an arbitrary ratio –
should play in the proper calculation of a punitive damages award.  Two cases, Henley v. 
Philip Morris, Inc. and Williams v. Philip Morris. Inc., provide excellent examples of 
courts that have found the tobacco industry’s behavior to warrant substantial punitive 
damages awards.
A. Henley v. Philip Morris, Inc.
The Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, examined 
reprehensibility in the context of the tobacco industry’s conduct in Henley v. Philip 
Morris, Inc. (“Henley”)155   The plaintiff, Patricia Henley (“Henley”), stated she began 
smoking with a friend at age fifteen because it made her feel “cool” and “grown up,” and 
that smoking served as a “rite of passage.”156  She preferred Philip Morris’ Marlboro 
brand, which the court said “us[ed] symbols of independence, autonomy, and mature 
strength for which teenagers were understood to yearn.”157
Henley attested that because cigarette packages lacked warnings at the time she 
began smoking, she believed that their contents – touted as “[t]obacco, pure and simple”
154 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
155 Henley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
156 Id. at 39.
157 Id. 
28
– were not harmful.158  Moreover, Henley asserted that she did not know cigarettes were 
addictive, and that “[n]othing in the advertising she saw suggested that if she started 
smoking she might be unable to stop.”159  Henley became addicted to cigarettes, and 
eventually contracted lung cancer.160  The jury concluded that before Henley had started 
smoking, Philip Morris (along with other cigarette manufacturers) knew that tobacco 
contained many carcinogens and also knew of epidemiological studies showing a strong 
correlation between smoking and the incidence of lung cancer.161
The jury awarded Henley $1.5 million in compensatory damages and $50 million 
in punitive damages.162  The trial judge, however, reduced the punitive damages award to 
$25 million; the Court of Appeal further reduced this award to $9 million, which brought 
the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages to 6:1.163  Despite this reduction, 
the ratio still was higher than four times the compensatory damages award, which ratio 
the State Farm Court expressed “might be close to the line of constitutional 
impropriety.”164  Explaining its reasoning for this award, the court stated that it examined 
the “most important of the three [Gore] guideposts” – the defendant’s reprehensibility:
The record reflects that defendant touted to children what it 
knew to be a cumulatively toxic substance, while doing 
everything it could to prevent them and other addicts and 
158 Id. 
159 Id.
160 Id. at 41.
161 Id. at 39.
162 Id. at 38.
163 Id. 
164 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003), citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991).
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prospective addicts from appreciating the true nature and 
effects of that product.  The result of this conduct was that 
millions of youngsters, including plaintiff, were persuaded 
to participate in a habit that was likely to, and did, bring 
many of them to early illness and death.  Such conduct 
supports a substantial award sufficient to reflect the moral 
opprobrium in which defendant’s conduct can and should 
be held, and warrants something approaching the maximum 
punishment consistent with constitutional principles.165
The court then examined each of the factors articulated in State Farm that 
contribute to the degree of reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct, finding that “[e]ach 
. . . support[s] finding a high degree of reprehensibility here.”166  As to the first factor –
whether the harm was physical or economic – the court recognized “the gist of plaintiff’s 
claim was . . . that its conduct caused [the plaintiff] severe bodily injury in the form of 
lung cancer.”167  In that respect, the court found that the “[d]efendant’s malicious 
infliction of such an injury is . . . substantially more reprehensible than the conduct at 
issue in [State Farm] (bad faith denial of insurance claim), Gore (intentional concealment 
of repair history in sale of ‘new’ BMW automobile), or Cooper Industries (unfair 
competition, including false advertising, in sale of competing product.)”168
Regarding the second factor – whether the defendant’s conduct “evinced an 
indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others” – the court stated 
that Philip Morris’ conduct “arguably betrayed an attitude characterized not by mere 
indifference or recklessness, but by a conscious acceptance of the injurious result.”169
165 Henley, 9 Cal. Rpt. 3d at 70.
166 Id. at 70.
167 Id.
168 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Moreover, the court noted that Philip Morris “consciously exploited the known 
vulnerabilities of children, who by its own words comprised its ‘traditional area of 
strength.’”170
As to the third factor – the plaintiff’s “financial vulnerability” – the court stated, 
“in cases such as this one, it makes sense to ask whether and to what extent the defendant 
took advantage of a known vulnerability on the part of the victim to the conduct 
triggering the award of punitive damages, or to the resulting harm.”171  The court made 
no further comment on this issue; one can assume from this silence, and from its previous 
statement that each factor “supports a high degree of reprehensibility,” that the court 
found this factor present.
Regarding the fourth and fifth factors – whether the conduct “involved repeated 
actions” and whether the harm was “the result of intentional malice, trickery, deceit, or 
mere accident” – the court held, “[o]bviously defendant’s conduct was also particularly 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 71.  The court was referring to a November 19, 1985 document entitled “Presentation to Hamish 
Maxwell” that contains the contents of an advertising agency’s presentation regarding brand image.  The 
document states, in part:
Marlboro’s traditional area of strength has, of course, been young people because the 
principal message its imagery delivers is independence.  For young people who are 
always being told what to do, the Marlboro Man says “I’m in charge of my life.” . . . Now 
more than ever for younger smokers, Marlboro is the essence of social responsibility.  
The popularity of the brand in its age group makes it the only brand to smoke if you are 
to be accepted at all.  Further, the integrity of the Marlboro man makes him 
representative of the ideal smoker – self confident and secure.  
E, J.C. “Presentation to Hamish Maxwell 851119.” 18 Nov 1985. Bates: 2041096545-2041096578. 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/pm/2041096545-6578.html at 2041096573.  (All citations herein to 
tobacco industry documents are in the form used on Tobacco Documents Online, 
http://www.tobaccodocuments.org, and generally include the author’s name, document description, 
document date, Bates number range, and URL.)
171 Henley, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 71.
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reprehensible . . . it ‘involved repeated actions’ rather than ‘an isolated incident,’ and it 
inflicted harm by ‘intentional malice, trickery, or deceit,’ rather than ‘mere accident.’”172
Thus, the court concluded, it “appears that all five of the [State Farm] sub factors
. . . point to a high degree of reprehensibility.”173  It felt, however, that the State Farm
Court’s discussion of the second Gore guidepost, the ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages, could not sustain the $25 million award.  In light of State Farm, 
the court did “not believe the 17-to-1 ratio reflected in the present judgment can 
withstand scrutiny.”174  The Court believed, nonetheless, that a ratio higher than 4 to 1 –
in this case, a 6 to 1 ratio – is justified
by the extraordinarily reprehensible conduct of which 
plaintiff was a direct victim.  There is no reason to believe 
that the compensatory damages were inflated so as to 
duplicate elements of the punitive award.  Moreover, as we 
have noted, plaintiff’s injuries were not merely economic, 
but physical, and nothing done by defendant mitigated or 
ameliorated them in any respect.175
The court thus affirmed the judgment “in all respects except as to the amount of 
punitive damages,” and reduced the punitive damages award to $9 million.176  Insisting 
that even the reduced award is not justified, Philip Morris asked the California Supreme 
Court to review the award to resolve “the important question of whether a punitive 
172 Id. at n. 20, quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003).
173 Id. at 71.
174 Id. at 73.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 75.  The total judgment, including the $1.5 million compensatory damages award, thus was $10.5 
million.
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damages award can be based on harm to non-parties.”177  Philip Morris further requested 
that the court “address how a defendant’s wealth can be considered in calculating 
punitive damages.”178  Henley argued “that review of the case is not warranted.  Punitives 
can only be reviewed by the state Supreme Court to ‘secure uniformity of decision’ or to 
‘settle an important question of law,’ and neither issue is present here . . . .”179
On April 28, 2004 the California Supreme Court granted Philip Morris’ request 
for review; however, on September 15, 2004, the court granted Henley’s motion to 
dismiss this review.180  This decision represents the first time the California Supreme 
Court has upheld a damages award in a smoking and health case.181
In response, Henley was quoted as saying: “I’m delighted. There’s justice in this 
world.”182  She also expressed her frustration over the length and difficulty of her case, 
asking, “How many times do you have to win a case before you win a case?”183  David 
Sylvia, a spokesman for Philip Morris’ parent company, Altria Group Inc., was quoted as 
177 Calif. High Court Agrees to Review $9 Million Punitive Award, 19 No. 18 Andrews Tobacco Indus. 
Litig. Rep. 4 (2004).
178
 Presumably, Philip Morris would have liked the court to conclude that a defendant’s wealth cannot be 
considered in the punitive damages calculus.  The State Farm Court, however, stated only that a 
defendant’s wealth “cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award.” 538 U.S. at 427.
179 Calif. High Court, supra note 177.
180 See Henley v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2004) (granting review); 
Henley v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 2004 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2004) (granting motion to 
dismiss review).
181
 Myron Levin, State High Court Backs Damages in Smoker’s Case, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2004, at C2.
182 Id.  Henley “said she had created a foundation and planned to use most of her award to support anti-
smoking campaigns and help children with respiratory ailments.”  Id.
183 Id.
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saying that “the company was disappointed and considering an appeal to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.”184
On October 27, 2004, the United States Supreme Court granted Philip Morris’s 
application for a stay of remittitur, thus allowing the company to delay payment of the 
$10.5 million total judgment pending its “timely filing and disposition of a petition for 
writ of certiorari.”185  The Court’s brief order stated that if it denies Philip Morris’s 
petition, the stay “shall terminate automatically.” 186  If the Court grants the petition, the 
stay “shall terminate upon the issuance of the mandate of this Court.”187  The Court’s 
decision is pending.
B. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc.
In Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc.,188 the Oregon Court of Appeals concluded 
similarly that Philip Morris’s conduct was highly reprehensible.  It did not, however, feel 
that State Farm bound it to restrict the punitive damages award to within a single-digit 
ratio to the compensatory damages award.
Mayola Williams sued Philip Morris after her husband Jesse died of lung cancer 
in 1997.189  Mr. Williams had smoked Philip Morris cigarettes, primarily Marlboros, from 
the early 1950s until his death.190  According to the court, Mr. Williams was “ highly 
184 Id.
185 Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Henley, No. 04A284, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 7092 (October 27, 2004).
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 193 Or. App. 527 (2004).
189 Id. at 530.
190 Id.
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addicted” to tobacco, smoked three packs of cigarettes a day, and “resisted accepting or 
attempting to act on” the “increasing amount of information that linked smoking to health 
problems.”191  The court stated that “[i]n resisting the information about the dangers of 
smoking, [Mr.] Williams was responding to a campaign that defendant, together with the 
rest of the tobacco industry, created and implemented for the purpose of undercutting the 
effect of that information.”192
After a trial, the jury awarded Mrs. Williams $821,485.80 in compensatory 
damages, consisting of $21,485.80 in economic damages and $800,000 in noneconomic 
damages.193  The trial court subsequently reduced the amount of noneconomic damages 
to $500,000.194  The jury also awarded her $79.5 million in punitive damages, which the 
trial court reduced to $32 million.195  The appeals court subsequently reinstated the jury’s 
$79.5 million award.196   The court noted that Philip Morris’s “net worth is over $17 
billion, and its profits for the year closest to the trial were over $1.6 billion, or 
approximately $30.7 million per week. The jury’s award of $79.5 million, thus, is equal 
to a little more than two and a half weeks’ profit.”197  The United States Supreme Court, 
however, granted Philip Morris’ petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the appeals 
191 Id. at 530-531.  These facts, and others herein attributed to the court, are “facts that the jury could have 
found on the evidence before it.”  Id. at 530.
192 Id. at 531.
193 Id. at 535.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 182 Or. App. 44, 71 (2002).
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court’s decision, and “remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its recent decision 
in [State Farm].”198
On remand, the issue before the appeals court was “the extent to which th[e] 
award of punitive damages is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, particularly as the [Supreme] Court interpreted it in State Farm.”199  The 
court began its analysis by distinguishing State Farm.  It noted that in State Farm, the 
Supreme Court
considered the fact that the [plaintiffs] had received 
$1 million as full compensation for a year and a half of 
emotional distress.  Also, because State Farm paid the 
excess verdict before the [plaintiffs] filed their bad faith 
action, they had suffered only minor economic injuries.  
Their emotional harm thus arose from an economic 
transaction, not from a physical assault or trauma, and they 
had suffered no physical injuries.200
Also, “the [State Farm plaintiffs] were unable to point to evidence in the record 
demonstrating harm to anyone other than those involved in the case.”201  Finally, the 
court continued, “the [Supreme] Court observed that State Farm’s great wealth did not 
support an otherwise unconstitutional award, in part, because the purpose of much of that 
wealth was to enable State Farm to pay the claims of its policyholders and, in part, 
because wealth by itself cannot make up for the failure to satisfy other guideposts, such 
as reprehensibility, to justify an award.”202
198 Williams, 193 Or. App. at 530.
199 Id. at 535.
200 Id. at 551.
201 Id.
202 Id.
36
In this case, on the other hand, the court found
there is evidence concerning other Oregon victims of 
defendant’s decades-long fraudulent scheme.  The tobacco 
industry and defendant directed the same conduct toward 
thousands of smokers in Oregon.  They all received the 
same representations, from the same entities, and through 
the same media, and the industry intended to induce 
Oregon smokers to act on those representations in the same 
way.  That conduct was a fundamental part of defendant’s 
business strategy; Williams was simply one of its many 
Oregon victims.203
“Under the facts of this case,” the court continued, “the evidence of injury to other[s] is 
not an attempt to blacken defendant’s reputation in general, but, rather, it described the 
consequences to other Oregonians resulting from the very actions that harmed 
plaintiff.”204
The court felt its “primary issue” to consider was “whether the jury’s award is 
consistent with the Gore guideposts as the Court refined them in State Farm.”205  As the 
Henley court had done, the Williams court paid close attention to Gore’s first guidepost, 
the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.206 “In our view,” the court stated upfront, 
“this case involves conduct that is more reprehensible than that in any of the cases that 
we have discussed.”207
203 Id. at 556.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 557.  The court found “[a]s an initial matter, in general, the State of Oregon has a legitimate 
interest in punishing defendant and deterring it from further misconduct.”  Id.  In Gore, the court noted, 
“those interests were limited by, among other things, the nature of the harm (economic) and the diversity of 
state approaches to dealing with deceptive trade practices.” Id.  In this case, however, the court found “the 
state’s interests are at their maximum; they involve the protection of the health and lives of its citizens.”  Id.  
206 Id.
207 Id.
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The court eloquently summed up the reprehensibility of Philip Morris’s conduct 
as follows:
Defendant sold a product that it knew would cause death or 
serious injury to its customers when they used it as 
defendant intended them to use it.  Despite that knowledge, 
defendant, together with the rest of the tobacco industry, 
engaged in an extensive campaign to convince smokers that 
the issue of cigarette safety was unresolved.  It insisted that 
more research was necessary at the very time that it was 
carefully avoiding doing the very research for which it 
called, although it had an extensive program of research 
into other issues.  Rather, it used its research to determine 
the optimum dose of nicotine in each cigarette, knowing of, 
but publicly denying, nicotine’s highly addictive properties.  
Defendant also knew that, because of those addictive 
properties, it would be difficult for smokers to quit 
smoking, and it relied on its fraudulent message to 
discourage them from doing so.  The result, as defendant 
hoped, was that addicted smokers remained addicted, and 
purchased more of its product.  In short, defendant used 
fraudulent means to continue a highly profitable business 
knowing that, as a result, it would cause death and injury to 
large numbers of Oregonians.208
The court also went through each of the reprehensibility factors set out in State 
Farm.  As to the first, the nature of the harm, the court found “[h]ere, the harm caused 
was physical rather than economic and, for Williams, the most serious physical harm 
possible, his death.”209 As to the next factor, whether the “tortious conduct evinced an 
208 Id. at 557-558 (stating, again, what a “jury could have found”).  In another recent smoking and health 
case against Philip Morris in Oregon, the court awarded the plaintiff (the estate of Michelle Schwarz) $100 
million in punitive damages.  See Court Hears Appeal of Tobacco Damages, CORVALLIS GAZETTE-TIMES 
(Oregon), at http://www.gazettetimes.com/articles/2004/09/21/news/oregon/tueore03.txt (last update: 
September 20, 2004).  Ms. Schwarz had smoked Philip Morris’s “low-tar” Merit brand of cigarettes before 
dying of lung cancer in 1999 at age 53.  Id.  Although the trial judge felt that the jury’s original award of 
$150 million was excessive, he found Philip Morris’s conduct reprehensible and allowed a $100 million 
award – 595 times the $168,000 compensatory damages amount.  Id.  On (Philip Morris’) appeal to the 
Oregon Court of Appeals, the estate’s lawyers claimed that Philip Morris “fraudulently marketed . . . 
Merit[s] . . . as safer than regular cigarettes” and claimed that it “schemed, manipulated and defrauded 
Oregonians into believing Merit cigarettes were a healthy alternative to quitting smoking.” Id. (internal 
quotation omitted).  The appeal is pending.  Id.
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indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others,” the court noted 
that Philip Morris’s “conduct not only shows a reckless disregard of the safety of others, 
but conduct with knowledge that others would be harmed by its actions.” 210 “Moreover,”
the court noted, “defendant’s fraud was motivated by economic considerations . . . . the 
jury could have found that defendant misrepresented the safety of its product for its own 
pecuniary gain, gain that it would not otherwise have achieved but for the 
misrepresentation.”211
As to the fourth consideration,212 whether “the conduct involved repeated actions 
or was an isolated incident,” the court found “[n]ot only did defendant’s conduct involve 
repeated action, those actions were directed at Oregon citizens over a period of 40 
years.”213
Finally, as to the fifth consideration, whether the “harm was the result of 
intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident,” the court noted, “[h]ere, 
defendant intentionally misled the Oregon public regarding the results of its research and 
increased the nicotine in its products to make them more addictive and more 
dangerous.”214
209 Williams, 193 Or. App. at 558.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212
 The court stated that it had “no evidence” regarding the third consideration, the plaintiff’s financial 
vulnerability.  Id.  One can assume, however, that the financial resources of Jesse Williams, a retired school 
janitor (see Jef Feeley & Joyzelle Davis, Philip Morris Fails to Win Reduction of $69 Mln Award, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 9, 2004), were no match for those of Philip Morris, whose net worth, according to 
the court, “was over $17 billion” and whose “profit for the most recent year for which figures were 
available was $1.6 billion.”  Williams, 193 Or. App. at 563.
213 Id. at 558.
214 Id. at 559.
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The court then examined the second Gore guidepost – “the disparity between the 
actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award.”215  It 
began with acknowledging, “[t]here is no doubt that, under the holding in State Farm, 
there is a presumption of constitutional invalidity arising from the jury’s award of 
punitive damages in this case, if there is, in fact, a 96 to 1 ratio between the punitive and 
compensatory damages awarded to plaintiff.”216  Instead of invalidating the punitive 
damages award on this basis, however, the court inquired instead “as to what is the 
correct amount of compensatory damages to consider for purposes of computing the ratio 
under the second guidepost in Gore.”217
To answer that question, the court cited TXO’s premise that “[i]t is appropriate to 
consider the magnitude of the potential harm that the defendant’s conduct would have 
caused to its intended victim if the wrongful plan had succeeded, as well as the possible 
harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior were not
deterred.”218  In that case, the Supreme Court “calculated the potential harm of TXO’s 
conduct to be more than 50 times the $19,000 in actual damages that the respondents 
suffered.”219
Applying TXO’s principles to the facts of the case, the court first noted the jury’s 
award of $21,485 in economic damages and $800,000 in noneconomic damages 
215 Id.
216 Id. at 560.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 561, quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (plurality 
opinion).  See supra Section II (A).
219 Id.  The Court in TXO had calculated the potential harm to be at least $1 million.  See TXO, 509 U.S. at 
461-462.
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($821,485 total compensatory damages).220  The court noted also that in addition to 
harming Mr. Williams, Philip Morris “inflicted potential harm on the members of the 
public in Oregon through its fraudulent promotional scheme.”221 “Based on . . . 
particularly, the pervasiveness of defendant’s advertising scheme in Oregon,” the court 
found that it “would have been reasonable for the jury to infer that at least 100 members 
of the Oregon public had been misled by the defendant’s advertising scheme over a 40-
year period in the same way that Williams had been misled.”222  Multiplying the 
$821,485 compensatory damages award by 100 yields a theoretical $82 million 
compensatory damages award – an award greater than the $79.5 million in punitive 
damages that the jury awarded.  
The court continued, however, that “even if the $79[.5] million award is deemed 
to exceed a single digit ratio, it is difficult to conceive of more reprehensible misconduct
for a longer duration of time on the part of a supplier of consumer products to the Oregon 
public than what occurred in this case.”223  This reprehensibility, the court found, “far 
exceeds that of TXO where the Court upheld a 10 to 1 ratio, or in Bocci, where we upheld 
a 7 to 1 ratio.”224
The court concluded that “the unique facts in this case, when compared to the 
circumstances considered by the Supreme Court and this court in other cases, would 
220 Williams, 193 Or. App. at 561.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 562.
223 Id. 
224 Williams, 193 Or. App. at 562, citing Bocci v. Key Pharm., Inc., 189 Ore. App. 349 (2003), modified on 
recons, 190 Ore. App. 407 (2003).
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justify more than a single-digit award under the Due Process Clause.”225  Most 
importantly, the court found that the $79.5 million punitive damages award “does not 
violate the Due Process clause under the guidelines provided by State Farm because the 
amount of the award is reasonable and proportionate to the wrong inflicted on decedent 
and the public of this state.”226  The court thus “reinstate[d] the [$79.5 million] award of 
punitive damages as originally found by the jury.”227 Philip Morris has petitioned the 
Oregon Supreme Court for review, and oral arguments are scheduled for May 10, 
2005.228
V. Secondary Reprehensibility
One can argue that Williams and Henley decisions firmly establish the tobacco 
industry’s primary reprehensibility.  Although industry might not agree, following these 
decisions it would be very difficult  for a tobacco company to argue that it does not 
deserve a large punitive damages award against it – even one in excess of nine times the 
compensatory damages amount.  
Challenges to such an award’s appropriateness can be met with evidence of the 
industry’s secondary reprehensibility.  As stated above, secondary reprehensibly involves 
the reprehensibility of the defendant’s litigation tactics, which often result in the 
plaintiff’s inability to maintain an action against the defendant.  In a recent Seventh 
225 Id.
226 Id. at 563.
227 Id.
228 See Oregon Courts Website, Entry Form for Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., n.k.a. Philip Morris USA 
Inc., SC No. S51805, CA No. A106791, at
http://www.ojd.state.or.us/records/sccalendar.nsf/0/92f454325a5e36d388256f34007d747b?OpenDocument
(last visited December 28, 2004).
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Circuit decision, Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging (“Mathias”),229 Judge Richard A. 
Posner proposed that a defendant who uses its wealth to make litigating a case against it 
extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible – i.e., whose “secondary reprehensibility” is 
particularly high – may warrant a punitive damages award exceeding a single-digit ratio 
between punitive and compensatory damages.
A. Mathias v. Accor
In November 1998, while staying in Room 504 of a Motel 6 (the “Motel”) in 
downtown Chicago, brother and sister Burl and Desiree Mathias were bitten by 
bedbugs.230  They brought suit against Motel 6’s affiliated entities (collectively, the 
“defendant”),231 claiming “that in allowing guests to be attacked by bedbugs in a motel 
that charges upwards of $100 a day for a room . . . the defendant was guilty of ‘willful 
and wanton’ conduct and thus under Illinois law is liable for punitive as well as 
compensatory damages.”232  Although the jury awarded each plaintiff only $5,000 in 
compensatory damages, it awarded them each $186,000 in punitive damages – 37.2 times 
the amount of the compensatory damage award.233  The defendant appealed, primarily 
based on the punitive damages award.234  Judge Posner issued the opinion of the United 
States Court of Appeal for the Seventh Circuit.
229 Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003).
230 Id. at 673.
231
  The court treated the affiliated entities as a single entity. Id.
232 Id. at 674.
233 Id.
234 Id.
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Judge Posner first addressed the defendant’s primary reprehensibility.  The 
defendant claimed that “at worst it is guilty of negligence, and if this is right the plaintiffs 
were not entitled by Illinois law to any award of punitive damages.”235  The court found 
this claim meritless because the plaintiffs had shown amply that the defendant was 
grossly negligent “in the strong sense of an unjustifiable failure to avoid a known risk.”236
In support of this conclusion, Judge Posner discussed evidence that prior to the Mathias’
stay, the Motel’s exterminator had discovered bedbugs in several rooms, and 
recommended that they hire him to spray the rooms.237  Although the extermination cost 
would be merely $500, the Motel refused.238  The exterminator found bedbugs again the 
following year, as did the Motel’s manager, and again the Motel failed to rectify the 
problem.239  As the court put it, the infestation “began to reach farcical proportions” when 
a guest who had complained about being bitten by bugs found bugs in two subsequent 
rooms to which the Motel moved him.240 The Motel instructed its desk clerks to inform 
guests that the bedbugs were ticks, “apparently on the theory that customers would be 
less alarmed, though in fact ticks are more dangerous than bedbugs because they spread 
Lyme Disease and Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever.”241  Additionally, “[r]ooms that the 
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 675.
241 Id.
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motel had placed on ‘Do not rent, bugs in room’ status nevertheless were rented.”242  On 
the night the Mathiases stayed in Room 504, guests occupied all but one of the rooms 
even though the Motel had placed many of them (including Room 504) on “do not rent”
status.243
Judge Posner noted that “[a]lthough bedbugs are not as serious as the bites of 
some other insects, they are painful and unsightly.”244  He found that the Motel’ s failure 
to warn its guests and to eliminate the problem “amounted to fraud and probably to 
battery as well,” and concluded that there was sufficient evidence of “willful and wanton 
conduct” – i.e. sufficient primary reprehensibility – to justify the court’s award of 
punitive damages.245
Judge Posner then turned to the more difficult determination – the proper amount
of punitive damages.246  The defendant argued that a jury constitutionally could award 
each plaintiff a maximum of $20,000 – four times the $5,000 compensatory damages 
amount.247  In support, it cited State Farm’s language that “few awards [of punitive 
damages] exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive damages and compensatory 
damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process”248 and its premise that “four 
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id., citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
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times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional 
impropriety.”249
Judge Posner commented astutely, however, that “[t]he Supreme Court did not . . . 
lay down a 4-to-1 or single-digit-ratio rule – it said merely that ‘there is a presumption 
against an award that has a 145-to-1 ratio’ – and it would be unreasonable to do so.”250
Judge Posner reasoned that instead of following a set ratio, the court should consider 
“why punitive damages are awarded and why the [Supreme] Court has decided that due 
process requires that such awards be limited.”251
Judge Posner found that because punitive damages imply “punishment,” punitive 
damages awards should comport with the standard penal theory principle that “the 
punishment should fit the crime.”252  Importantly, however, Posner noted that this 
“principle is modified when the probability of detection is very low . . . or the crime is 
potentially lucrative . . . .”253
Judge Posner stated that among other things, “the defendant may well have 
profited from its misconduct because by concealing the infestation it was able to keep 
renting rooms,” and “[t]he hotel’s attempt to pass off the bedbugs as ticks . . . may have 
postponed the instituting of litigation to rectify the hotel’s misconduct.” 254  Awarding 
punitive damages in this case, therefore,
249 Id. at 676, citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
250 Id., citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id.
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serve[d] the additional purpose of limiting the defendant’s 
ability to profit from its fraud by escaping detection and 
(private) prosecution.  If a tortfeasor is “caught” only half 
the time he commits torts, then when he is caught he should 
be punished twice as heavily in order to make up for the 
times he gets away.255
Judge Posner then commented on what we call the defendant’s “secondary 
reprehensibility”: its litigation tactics.  In this area, the defendant’s wealth comes into 
play in considering a punitive damages award’s constitutionality.  On this point, Posner 
noted that although on its own the “defendant’s wealth is not a sufficient basis for 
awarding punitive damages,” wealth becomes relevant where it
enabl[es] the defendant to mount an extremely aggressive 
defense against suits such as this and by doing so to make 
litigating against it very costly, which in turn may make it 
difficult for the plaintiffs to find a lawyer willing to handle 
their case, involving as it does only modest stakes, for the 
usual 33-40 percent contingent fee.256
Judge Posner believed that in this case, the defendant “investe[d] in developing a 
reputation intended to deter plaintiffs.”257  Otherwise, he found it difficult to explain “the 
great stubborn[n]ess with which it has defended this case, making a host of frivolous 
evidentiary arguments despite the very modest stakes even when the punitive damages 
awarded by the jury are included.”258 Posner concluded, “[a]ll things considered, we 
254 Id. at 677.
255 Id.  This harkens back to the Utah Supreme Court’s justification for awarding high punitive damages in 
the State Farm case.  See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1153 (Utah 2001) 
(“State Farm’s actions, because of their clandestine nature, will be punished at most in one out of every 
50,000 cases as a matter of statistical probability”).  
256 Mathias, 347 F.3d at 677.
257 Id.
258 Id.  In what Judge Posner called “a good example of the frivolous character of the motions and of the 
defendant’s pertinacious defense of them on appeal,” the defendants had moved in limine to exclude 
evidence of all other rooms except Room 504; the trial judge denied the motion.  Id. at 675.
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cannot say that the award of punitive damages was excessive, albeit the precise number 
chosen by the jury was arbitrary.”259  Noting that the lack of punitive damages award 
guidelines makes this arbitrariness inevitable, he affirmed the $186,000 award.260
B. The Law and Economics Background of Judge Posner’s Decision
Judge Posner’s decision in Mathias to hold the defendant accountable for its 
litigation tactics – i.e., its secondary reprehensibility – likely flows directly from his 
philosophy of economics’ role in law.  In his book The Economic Analysis of Law, 
Posner describes the “Learned Hand Formula” of liability for negligence (the “Hand 
Formula”).261  The Hand Formula takes into account the probability of a loss (“P”) and 
the loss’s magnitude (“L”).262  The expected cost of a loss is P times L.263
Translated to a products liability setting, manufacturers often are held liable for 
defective or dangerous products, and thus must take precautions to prevent consumer 
injury. For example, suppose a manufacturer produces soda in bottles at a production cost 
of 40 cents per unit, and the loss if the bottle causes an accident is $10,000 (L).264  If the 
expected probability of the bottle causing an accident is 1 in 100,000 (.00001) (P), then 
259 Id. at 678.
260 Id. “The judicial function,” Judge Posner said, “is to police a range, not a point.”  Id., citing BMW of N. 
Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582-83 (1996); TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 458 (1993) (plurality opinion).
261 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167-68 (6th ed. 2003).
262 Id. at 167.
263 Id. For example, suppose the probability of a car accident occurring is .001, and the accident’s 
magnitude if it occurs is $10,000.  The expected accident cost (PL), therefore, is $10.  Suppose as well that 
another driver can prevent the accident from occurring at a cost of $8 – $2 less than the $10 expected 
accident cost.  Under the Hand Formula, if the second driver fails to take this precaution and an accident 
occurs, he will be held liable for the accident cost, $10,000.  Without holding him liable, he will have no 
incentive to invest money in preventative measures.  The driver will not be found liable, however, if the 
prevention cost exceeds the $10 expected accident cost.
264 A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 97 (2nd ed. 1989).
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the expected cost of a loss is 10 cents (P x L, or $10,000 x .00001) per unit.265  Under the 
Hand Formula, the manufacturer must take precautions that cost up to 10 cents per bottle
or face liability if the consumer is injured.  The manufacturer generally would choose to 
pass this additional amount on t o the consumer by adding it to the 40 cents per unit retail 
cost of the bottle, bringing the cost to 50 cents per unit.266  This gives the consumer the 
correct signal as to the bottle’s total cost, enabling her to maximize her welfare with 
respect to this purchase.
Where there is no liability on the manufacturer’s part, however, the consumer 
bears his or her own loss regardless of the manufacturer’s behavior.267  Because the 
manufacturer has no expected loss per unit, it sells the soda at only 40 cents per unit.268
If the consumer is informed perfectly about the product’s safety, the consumer in effect 
will add the expected loss (10 cents) to the retail cost, bringing the total, again, to 50 
cents per unit.  Hence, “[w]hen producers and consumers are risk neutral and consumers 
have perfect information about product risks, the choice of liability rule is irrelevant.”269
If, on the other hand, the consumers are not adequately informed about the product’s 
risks, they will purchase the product even if they would not have done so had they known 
its true cost.
265 Id. at 97.
266 Id. at 99.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 99-100.  
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C. Law and Economics Implications for Tobacco Industry Liability
As detailed above, courts have found that the tobacco industry for years concealed 
the dangers of smoking from the public.270  Smokers, therefore, typify the misinformed 
consumer in the law and economics products liability model.  Although new smokers 
today may be better informed about the major health risks associated with smoking, “this 
general knowledge does not necessarily translate into a belief that one is personally at 
higher risk of becoming seriously ill as a result of smoking.”271 Additionally, “general 
awareness of health risks does not mean that people are adequately informed about 
smoking in ways that might influence their smoking behavior.”272 For example, many 
smokers do not realize that so-called “light” or “low-tar” cigarettes are not safer than
regular cigarettes.273 Moreover, those who have died from smoking-related illnesses 
cannot benefit from any increased level of information – nor can those who already are 
addicted or sick.  Under the model described above, because these consumers were 
deceived, and thus “assumed to be ignorant of the product risks,” 274 they did not account 
for the cost of the risk in their cigarette purchases.  The law and economics model 
dictates, therefore, that the liability for their injuries falls on the tobacco companies’
shoulders to encourage them and other manufacturers to be honest with their customers.  
270 See supra Section IV (discussing tobacco industry primary reprehensibility).
271
 Cumming, K. Michael et al., Are Smokers Adequately Informed About the Health
Risks of Smoking and Medicinal Nicotine?, 6 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RESEARCH S333, S334 (Supplement 3, 
December 2004).
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 POLINSKY, supra note 264, at 101.
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This standard model, however, breaks down in the context of the smoking and 
health litigation.  The industry has “spared no cost in exhausting their adversaries’
resources short of the court house door,”275 and long has followed a “refuse to settle”
policy.276  To do so, the industry routinely puts the plaintiff in a smoking and health case 
“on trial,” conducting extensive interviews and depositions not only of the plaintiff, but 
also of all the plaintiff’s acquaintances who possibly could have a shred of information 
about the plaintiff or the case.  Through this investigation, the tobacco companies have 
“insist[ed] on a cradle-to-grave investigation of plaintiffs’ lives.  Marriages, job histories, 
personal hygiene, eating habits and even church going practices come under scrutiny.”277
Essentially, the companies “muck around in the past until they find something damaging”
and “[t]hen they play on it until the suit is dropped.”278
275
 Robert L. Rabin, A Sociological History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 857 
(1992).  Rabin discusses the tobacco industry’s “seemingly inexhaustible expenditure of resources,” but 
states that “cost estimates must be taken with a great deal of caution. . . . [because] the tobacco defense has 
never publicly indicated its expenses . . . .”  Id. at 867, n. 90.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers, however, 
have been more forthcoming in interviews.  [Lawyers have reported spending] “upward 
of $1 million out of pocket, for depositions, travel, medical experts and so on” in 
preparing the Cipollone case for litigation. . . . In addition, if they had been billing at their 
customary rates . . . , they would have charged another $2 million in fees. . . . [Reporter] 
David Gidmark reports an estimate of $100,000 in out-of-pocket expenses in the 
Galbraith [v. R.J. Reynolds] case. . . . Gidmark also reports an estimate of $260,000 in 
out-of-pocket expenses and $2 million in billable hours in preparing the first Horton [v. 
American Tobacco] trial. . . .
It can be safely assumed that the defense costs considerably exceeded the plaintiffs’ 
spending, both in out-of-pocket expenditures, and, particularly, in billable hours.
Id.
276
 “Memorandum re: April 19, 1988 meeting of Sub-Committee of National Counsel on New Jersey 
Litigation.” 29 Apr 1988. Bates: 680711866-680711883. http://tobaccodocuments.org/tplp/680711866-
1883.html at 680711869.  This memorandum refers to a “firm adherence to the no settlement policy by all 
industry members.”  Id.
277
 Patricia Bellew Gray, Legal Warfare: Tobacco Firms Defend Smoker Liability Suits With Heavy 
Artillery, Wall St. J., April 29, 1987.
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This “secondary reprehensibility” has made the tobacco industry largely immune
from liability.  As a result, although the tobacco industry has had a number of adverse 
judgments against it, it has made payments to only two plaintiffs in the history of 
smoking and health litigation (as of this paper’s writing). 279  Under these circumstances, 
the tobacco companies have had no economic incentive to take proper safety precautions, 
278 Id.
There is evidence that the industry rebuffed outside attempts to learn its motives for engaging in such 
probing investigations.  In a December 10, 1992 file note, Philip Morris executive Craig Fuller 
memorialized a then-recent telephone conversation with Wall Street Journal reporter Alix Freedman.  See
Fuller, C. “Note for WSJ File.” 10 Dec 1992. Bates: 2022846468-2022846469. 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/bliley_pm/23802.html [hereinafter Fuller Note].  See also Tobacco 
Documents Online, Craig Fuller Profile,http://tobaccodocuments.org/profiles/people/fuller_craig_l.html 
(last visited December 3, 2004) (describing Fuller’s roles at Philip Morris).  According to the note, 
Freedman was working on a story that would “focus on the strategies the industry uses against plaintiffs.”  
See Fuller Note, supra.  Freedman asked Fuller if she could “talk with one of our lawyers about why the 
industry does what it does….why it is so tough….how it makes the process so expensive for 
plaintiffs….and, why we go through so much of an effort with discovery.”  Id.  Fuller stated that he “asked 
[Freedman] what kind of questions she had in mind: She said there was a case (not sure if it’s a PM case) 
where the industry conducted an extensive investigation of a plaintiff and discovered he had been a 
homosexual while in the military.”  Id.  Fuller’s indignant response: “What she ‘needs to know’ is why 
this kind of information is relevant!  I reaffirmed that we would simply not be willing to discuss legal 
strategy.”  Id.
279
 In Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. (“Carter”), the jury awarded long-time smoker Grady 
Carter and his wife $750,000 in compensatory damages in 1996.  See Thomas C. Tobin, Ex- Smoker Savors 
Tobacco Win, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 16, 2001, at 1B.  A Florida appeals court overturned the 
judgment in 1998. Id.  Pending appeal, B&W sent Carter a check for $1.1 million (the amount of the 
judgment, plus interest).  Id.  The Florida Supreme Court reinstated the jury’s verdict in November 2001, 
and the United States Supreme Court refused to hear the case in March 2001, making the Carter “officially 
. . . the first individual plaintiff in 40 years of tobacco litigation to claim a complete victory against Big 
Tobacco.” Id. See also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Carter, 121 S.Ct. 2593 (2001) (mem.) 
(denying B&W’s petition for a writ of certiorari).  In Kenyon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (“Kenyon”), a 
Florida jury awarded Floyd Kenyon, a smoker who had contracted cancer, $165,000 in compensatory 
damages in 2001 (it did not award money for punitive damages or pain and suffering).  See Julian Pecquet, 
Tobacco Company Pays $196,000 to Smoker’s Estate, Sarasota Herald-Tribune Online, at
http://www.heraldtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/artikkel?SearchID=73145771031021&Avis=SH&Dato=20030
829&Kategori=NEWS&Lopenr=308290325&Ref=AR (last updated: August 29, 2003).  In August 2003, 
RJR paid $196,000 (the jury’s award, plus accumulated interest) to the deceased plaintiff’s estate.  Id.  On 
January 26, 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to consider RJR’s appeal of the case.  See R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. v. Kenyon, 124 S.Ct. 1171 (2004) (mem.) (denying Reynolds’ petition for a writ of certiorari).  
Note that both of these “successful” cases involved frivolous, but expensive, United States Supreme Court
appeals.
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and their prices have not reflected the actual cost of using their products.280  The result 
has been “too little care and . . . excessive output”281 – i.e., the continued sale of billions 
of packages of a lethal product (with revenues in the billions of dollars) – coupled with 
consumers who have no recourse for the resultant harm.  Punishing the industry’s 
secondary reprehensibility through large punitive damage awards, therefore, would help 
to rectify this unfairness, and would put smoking and health litigation back in line with 
the standard law and economics welfare-maximizing model.   
D. The Industry’s Motives
Why would the tobacco industry spend millions of dollars defending cases whose 
settlement values are far less than their defense costs?  The most, and perhaps only, 
logical explanation is that the industry does not fear “writing checks to a few plaintiffs,”
but, rather, fears “the public collapse of its reputation as being invulnerable to legal 
claims.”282  As J. F. Hind, an R.J. Reynolds (“Reynolds”) director from 1979 to 1980, 
stated, the industry must “[v]igorously defend any case; look upon each as being capable 
280
 For a thorough discussion of the role of law and economics in the context of smoking and health 
litigation, see Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post 
Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YLJ 1163 (1998).  That article estimates the nominal price of cigarettes 
(i.e. the production and marketing costs) at $2.00, and “the present value of the future health-related costs” 
to a smoker at $2.00.  Id. at 1176.  Ideally, then, “the consumer would purchase a pack of cigarettes if and 
only if she valued a pack at $4.00 or higher.”  Id.  If, however, the consumer “does not internalize the 
health-related costs of smoking – that is, the additional $2.00 of costs has no effect on her decision to 
smoke,” the consumer then would purchase the cigarettes even if she valued them at less than $4.00.  Id.  
Suppose, then, that the cigarette manufacturer “could completely eliminate the $2.00 per pack risk by 
investing an additional $1.50 per pack in safety measures.”  Id.  In such case, “the efficient outcome would 
be for the manufacturer to make the investment, thereby eliminating the risk associated with the 
cigarettes.”  Id.  But, if the manufacturer is not liable for the consumer’s injury and the consumer is either 
uninformed about or undeterred by the product’s risks, “the manufacturer would not invest the $1.50 in 
risk reduction because doing so would cause [it] to lose customers.  Consumers would not perceive the 
$2.00 reduction in risks associated with the additional cost and would instead purchase cheaper and less 
safe brands.” Id.
281 POLINSKY, supra note 264, at 101.
282
 Richard A. Daynard, Catastrophe Theory and Tobacco Litigation. TOBACCO CONTROL 1994; 3:59-64, 
59.
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of establishing a dangerous precedent and refuse to settle any case for any amount.”283
Similarly, in a report written to a Reynolds executive “for the Purpose of Rendering 
Legal Advice Concerning Smoking and Health Issues and Litigation,” a Reynolds 
attorney stated:
The industry’s success in the litigation is primarily because 
at the outset a decision was made to fight the lawsuits all 
out, never considering settlement in even the smallest sum. 
The industry felt then, and still does, that if any case were 
lost or settled, there would be thousands of potential 
claimants to whom payment – no matter how small – would 
be prohibitive.284
Philip Morris attorney Murray H. Bring285 demonstrated that company’s hard-line 
stance in a document entitled “Draft Speaking Notes for Legal Presentation,” boasting:
As you know, we have never lost a case in the almost 40-
year history of the litigation.  We have strong defenses, 
ample resources, and talented and experienced defense 
counsel . . . . We have enjoyed a remarkable record of 
success, and I want to assure you that the Legal Department 
will do everything within its power to preserve that 
record.286
283
 Hind, J.F. “Report Concerning Smoking and Health Prepared by RJR Employee Providing Confidential 
Information to RJR in-House Legal Counsel, to Assist in the Rendering of Legal Advice, and Transmitted 
to RJR Managerial Employee.” 29 Jun 1977. Bates: 505574976-505574977. 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/bliley_rjr/505574976-4977.html.
284 Jacob, E.J.; Jacob Medinger. “Report Prepared by RJR Outside Legal Counsel Transmitted to RJR 
Executives for the Purpose of Rendering Legal Advice Concerning Smoking and Health Issues and 
Litigation.” 27 Jun 1980. Bates: 504681987-504682023. http://tobaccodocuments.org/bliley_rjr/ 
504681987-2023.html at 504681997.
285
 Murray H. Bring was a member of the Philip Morris Co. Inc.’s Board of Directors in 1994, as well as its 
Senior Vice President and General Counsel.  He was a former senior partner in the firm of Arnold & Porter 
in Washington D.C.  See Tobacco Documents Online, Murray H. Bring Profile, at
http://tobaccodocuments.org/profiles/people/bring_murray_h.html (last visited December 3, 2004).
286 Bring, Murray H. “Draft Speaking Notes for Legal Presentation - April 23, 1993 [Privileged and 
confidential].”  23 Apr 1993. Bates: 2022840629-2022840642. 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/tplp/2022840629-0642.html at 2022840629; 0641-42.
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It is one thing for a company to choose to have a “refuse to settle” policy, but it is 
quite another to put this policy in action.  To do so, a defendant must have abundant 
resources to pay for a rigorous defense of each case, even if the defendant ends up paying 
far more in legal expenses for a particular case than it would have paid out in to the 
plaintiff in settlement.  The secret to the industry’s success, therefore, “is a lavishly 
financed and brutally aggressive defense that scares off or exhausts many plaintiffs long 
before their cases get to trial.” 287  Those plaintiffs who proceed with their cases “are 
vastly outgunned,” encountering the tobacco industry’s “overwhelming strength and 
prowess at every turn.” 288  The industry’s behavior, moreover, apparently targets not 
only plaintiffs; according to one article, a New Jersey judge complained: “They don’t just 
fight the case. They fight the lawyers, the judges, and the magistrates, too.” 289
As a result, the industry has managed to prevent many plaintiffs’ cases from 
proceeding by making it impossible for them to finance their actions.  As evidenced by a 
now-infamous letter from Reynolds’ counsel J. Michael Jordan to “Smoking and Health”
lawyers, this result is no accident.  In the letter, Jordan discusses plaintiff’s attorney John 
Robinson’s agreement “to dismiss his cases against the tobacco industry.”290  One factor 
that Jordan says contributed to this is that “the aggressive posture we have taken 
regarding depositions and discovery in general continues to make these cases extremely 
burdensome and expensive for plaintiffs’ lawyers, particularly sole practitioners.  To 
287
 Gray, supra note 277.  
288 Id.  
289 Id.  
290 See Jordan Memo, supra note 3. 
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paraphrase General Patton, the way we won these cases was not by spending all of 
Reynolds’ money, but by making that other son of a bitch spend all his.”291
E. Trying the Plaintiff
1. Interview tactics
The tobacco company’s investigation of a plaintiff’s case historically has begun
“as soon as possible after the filing of a petition.”292 A 1982 Brown & Williamson
(“B&W”) internal memorandum entitled “Training Materials for Counsel in Smoking & 
Health Litigation” (“Training Materials”) describes the investigation as being “divided 
into two major phases – the public records search and the interviews.”293 According to 
the Training Materials, the first phase involves the company forwarding a copy of the 
plaintiff’s complaint to investigators who “are trained and instructed to perform the most 
comprehensive public records search possible.”294  This “includes, for example, searching 
civil and criminal court records, property records, occupational license records, voter 
291 Id. The plaintiff in Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc. cited this letter in support of her argument that the 
tobacco industry’s “ability to outspend and over-litigate is . . . used to persuade those attorneys and their 
clients who were ‘foolish’ enough to file suit to voluntarily dismiss their claims.” 814 F.Supp. 414, 421 
(D.N.J. 1993).  The plaintiff’s law firm, who was moving to withdraw from the case because it had 
“become an unreasonable financial burden,” agreed with this position, stating:
Much of the extraordinary expenditure of money and time in these cases is directly 
attributable to the cigarette industry’s clearly articulated and effectively executed defense 
strategy: resisting discovery, appealing every adverse decision and avoiding settlement.  
In short, the industry does everything it can to cause plaintiffs’ attorneys to spend a great 
deal of money.
Id. at n. 14.  The court nonetheless denied the law firm’s motion to withdraw.  Id. at 428.
292
 “Training Materials for Counsel in Smoking & Health Litigation - Volume VII.” 1982. Bates: 
282010965-282011274. http://tobaccodocuments.org/ness/38753.html [hereinafter Training Materials] at 
282011028.
293 Id.
294 Id.
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registration records, birth, death and marriage certificates, etc.”295  Investigators then are 
“asked to begin constructing a ‘family tree’ for the afflicted smoker which will eventually 
identity all relatives, their dates of birth and death, and most importantly, the cause of 
death where available.”296
The next phase, according to the Training Materials, involves the defendant 
company’s attorneys taking what is described as a “lifestyle deposition” of the 
plaintiff.297 The Materials instruct the attorneys to collect “information about every 
aspect of the smoker’s life . . .  including the names of friends, relatives and business 
associates.”298  The Materials then recommend a type of sneak attack on the plaintiff’s 
inner circle, beginning with interviews of “‘remote’ subjects . . . (e.g. high school friends, 
former co-workers, etc.)”299 then closing in on the plaintiff’s “more closely related family 
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id.
Another memorandum states similarly that the best “lifestyle” evidence comes directly “from plaintiff 
and his friends, family and co-workers” and “results from meticulous investigation and discovery of all 
significant potential sources of information – object is comprehensive picture of what plaintiff heard, read, 
said and did about the asserted risks of smoking which will rivet itself to the jury’s mind.”  “Analysis of 
Plaintiffs’ Strict Liability and Improper Marketing Theories and our Defenses in Smoking and Health 
Liability Actions.” 29 Jul 1987. Bates: 689409577-689409612. 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/tplp/689409577-9612.html at 689409581-82.
For example, a Wall Street Journal Article described investigators’ efforts in tracking down a 
California plaintiff’s former neighbors in Fairbanks, Alaska – even though the plaintiff, Louise Sahli, 
“hadn’t seen those people in 10 years . . . .”  Gray, supra note 277.   Sahli stated: “Investigators went after 
everyone who ever knew us – my brother-in-law, my husband’s stepmother in Little Rock.  They get 
subpoenas, and they threaten people with jail if they don’t talk.”  Id.
299 Training Materials, supra note 292, at 282011028.  Another memorandum lists similar people to be 
interviewed, including “[c]o-workers, supervisors, neighbors, friends, relatives, schoolmates, teachers, 
[and] athletic coaches.”  See “International Product Liability Conference 11/12-13/1992.” 01 Nov 
1992. Bates: 2501196322-2501196529 at 2501196360. 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/bliley_pm/27390.html.
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and friends.”300  The “theory behind this approach,” according to the Training Materials, 
is that “more remote friends and relatives are less likely to be alerted by plaintiff or 
plaintiff’s counsel to expect an interview and much helpful information can be obtained 
from these sources at an early point to assist in interviewing and deposing more closely 
related friends and relatives.”301 Additionally, the Materials state that the
300
 Training Materials, supra note 292, at 282011029.  Another part of this memorandum states similarly:
The general pattern should be to interview people whose relationship to the 
plaintiff/decedent is somewhat remote and then to work in closer to the plaintiff/decedent 
and his family – both in terms of relationship and geography.  In other words, out-of-state 
relatives and former co-workers and supervisors, former neighbors and old friends, 
should be interviewed before close relatives, recent or current business associates, close 
current friends, or current neighbors.
Id. at 282011037.
Another memorandum, this one prepared for Reynolds, describes a similar plan of action:
If there is a live smoking plaintiff, discovery will begin with the taking of his or her 
deposition.  During the deposition, the smoking plaintiff will be asked to identify the 
persons with knowledge of his lifestyle.  The persons identified are then interviewed by 
investigators and/or attorneys.  At the same time, the smoking plaintiff’s wife and 
children are deposed.
. . . . 
If, on the other hand, the smoker is deceased, discovery begins with the deposition of the 
smoker’s spouse.  During that deposition, the spouse is asked to identify persons familiar 
with the deceased’s lifestyle.  The persons identified are then interviewed, while 
depositions of the children proceed.
. . . .
JM&F’s [the law firm Jacob, Medinger & Finnegan, LLP] general practice is to begin 
interviewing distant friends and relatives, gradually working its way into persons who are 
closer to the smoker.  Usually, the investigators retained by Reynolds will conduct the 
first interview.  If something ‘good’ turns up in the course of the interview, attorneys will 
be sent for a second round of interviews.  Generally, JM&F does not interview ‘close-in 
relatives’ (e.g., the smoker’s children) out of concern over possible ethical problems.  If, 
for whatever reason, such interviews become necessary, Davidson recommends having 
both an investigator and a lawyer present.
Stuhan, R.G.; Jones Day. “Memorandum Concerning Ongoing Litigation Prepared by RJR Outside Legal 
Counsel in Connection with Ongoing Litigation to Assist in Rendering Legal Advice, and Copied to RJR 
in-House and Outside Legal Counsel.” Bates: 515658222-515658297. 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/bliley_rjr/515658222-8297.html at 515658287-88.
301 See Training Materials, supra note 292, at 282011029.  
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primary purpose for starting interviews with peripheral 
characters is to provide fuel for the interviews of the key 
people: people are generally more willing to talk when the 
investigators can demonstrate that they know something 
about the plaintiff/decedent and his family.  It also enables 
the investigators to ask more pointed questions and 
questions designed to confirm information obtained 
through prior interviews or other similar sources.302
The Training Materials also suggest using two interviewers.  One of the reasons 
for this – that “ the investigators can play off of one another”303 – evokes the “Mutt and 
Jeff” or “good cop/bad cop” tactics often associated with improper police interrogation of 
a criminal suspect.304  Additionally, the Materials advise, “all witnesses in each category 
should eventually be interviewed, even if the information obtained proves to be 
cumulative.”305
2. Investigation Topics
Much of the industry’s investigation and witness questioning was based on its 
historical claim that smoking’s link to disease was an “open controversy.”306  Its
302 Id. at 282011037.
303 Id. at 282011038.
304
“A ‘Mutt and Jeff’ routine, also called the ‘good-cop, bad-cop’ routine, is a police interrogation method 
designed to coerce a confession from a suspect by using two investigators, one of which is hostile to the 
defendant, while the other expresses empathy and secretly offers to help the suspect if only he or she will 
cooperate.”  Midgley, Ian D. Just One Question Before We Get To Ohio v. Robinette: “Are You Carrying 
Any Contraband . . . Weapons, Drugs, Constitutional Protections . . . Anything Like That?” 48 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 173, 202 n. 191 (1997), citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 452 (1966).
305 See Training Materials, supra note 292, at 282011027.
306
 For a thorough discussion of the “open controversy” issue, see Jones Day Reavis & Pogue. “[Report on 
the Corporate Activity Project].” No date. Bates: 681879254-681879715. 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/tplp/681879254-9715.html.  This report discusses, among other things, a 
1971 memorandum written by Fred Panzer of the Tobacco Institute (the “Panzer Memorandum”) that 
allegedly “contains damaging admissions, provides plaintiffs with a roadmap of the Open Question 
strategy and reveals that the purpose of Open Question strategy was to manipulate judges, juries, 
politicians, and public opinion.”  Id. at 681879320.  For example, according to the report, the Panzer 
Memorandum stated: 
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questions thus sought to develop the industry’s argument that an alternative cause –
something other than smoking – could have caused the plaintiff’s (or the plaintiff’s 
decedent’s) illness.307
For example, B&W’s “Training Materials,” discussed above, puts forward several 
essential interview topics.  The topics include questions about “any attempts by 
plaintiff/decedent to quit or cut down on smoking”; whether “plaintiff/decedent ever 
tr[ied] to quit or cut down on drinking alcohol or caffeinated beverages (coffee, coke, 
etc.), to diet, to stop eating red meat or eggs, etc.; was he/she successful”; and 
“[p]laintiff’s/decedent’s awareness of claims of the health hazards of smoking, including 
use of terms like ‘cancer sticks’ and ‘coffin nails’; whether plaintiff/decedent was well-
read, etc.”308   Other suggested interview topics include: “[p]laintiff’s/decedent’s 
lifestyle, including possible areas of stress such as work pressure, marital problems, 
health problems, financial problems, etc.; plaintiff’s/decedent’s eating and drinking 
For nearly twenty years, this industry has employed a single strategy to defend itself on 
three major fronts – litigation, politics, and public opinion. While the strategy was 
brilliantly conceived and executed over the years helping us win important battles, it is 
only fair to say that it is not – nor was it intended to be – a vehicle for victory. On the 
contrary, it has always been a holding strategy, consisting of 
-creating doubt about the health charge without actually denying it
-advocating the public’s right to smoke, without actually urging them to 
take up the practice
- encouraging objective scientific research as the only way to resolve 
the question of health hazard
Id. at 681879320-21.
307
 For example, the Panzer Memorandum allegedly stated: “In the cigarette controversy, the public –
especially those who are present and potential supporters (e.g. tobacco state congressmen and heavy 
smokers) – must perceive, understand, and believe in evidence to sustain their opinions that smoking may 
not be the causal factor.”  Id. at 681879321-22.
308 See Training Materials, supra note 292, at 282011039-1040.
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habits, exercise habits, etc.” and “[p]laintiff’ s/decedent’s personality; i.e. was he strong-
willed, independent-minded, stubborn, decisive, hard-working, lazy, open-minded, well-
informed, nervous, anxious, emotional, calm, relaxed, etc.”309
H. Thayer v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company
An excellent historical example of a tobacco company’s successful attempt to use 
its scorched earth litigation tactics to evade liability, and a court’s evaluation of this 
practice, is Thayer v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company (“Thayer”).310  In that case, 
Geraldine Thayer brought a products liability suit against Liggett & Myers Tobacco 
Company (“Liggett”) in the United States District for the Western District of Michigan, 
alleging that smoking Liggett-brand cigarettes had caused her husband’s lung cancer and 
death.311 After a five-week trial, the jury “returned a verdict of no cause for action.”312
The court then issued an opinion to address certain procedural and evidentiary rulings it 
had made during the case’s preparation and trial.313
The court first addressed Liggett’s motion for a mistrial, which it had made prior 
to the trial’s conclusion and which the court had denied.314  Liggett had contended that 
comments the court made outside the jury’s presence indicated bias, and thus deprived 
309 Id. at 282011040.  The industry also has requested plaintiffs’ entire residence records, hoping to use 
things such as living near an industrial complex, use of pesticides, coal stove ownership, or inhaled smog as 
excuses for a plaintiff’s smoking related disease.  William E. Townsley & Dale K. Hanks, The Trial 
Court’s Responsibility to Make Cigarette Disease Litigation Affordable and Fair, 4 TOB. PROD. LITIG. 
RPTR. 4.11 (1989).
310 Thayer v. Liggett Myers Inc., No. 5314, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12796 (W.D. Mich., Feb. 20, 1970).
311 Id. at *1.
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 Id.
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Liggett of a fair trial.315  The court agreed that “[f]airness, and particularly procedural 
fairness, is . . . the primary concern of the court.  Such fairness is nothing less than the 
very heart of due process, and thus one of the primary guarantees of equality, in 
substance and appearance, before the law.”316  However, the court found, “[f]ar from 
being prejudicial, these remarks represented an objective appraisal of the developing 
procedural posture of this particular case, an appraisal which was itself the core of the 
rulings involved.”317
The court stated that it had made its observations, inter alia, “to emphasize that 
the court, in the exercise of its discretion and in the interest of justice, had considered the 
availability and use of resources by the parties in the development and presentation of 
their respective cases.”318  The court noted that the plaintiff was “a fifty-year old widow 
. . . represented by two members of a five-man law firm located in Saginaw, 
Michigan.”319 Liggett, on the other hand, was “one of the major tobacco manufacturing 
firms, [with] the services of the largest law firm in Western Michigan, plus another large 
law firm from New York City.”320  The court noted that such “a disparity between parties 
in the resources that can be brought to bear in the trial of a lawsuit need not, in itself, be 
315 Id.
316 Id. at *2.
317 Id.
318 Id. at *3.
319 Id.
320 Id. at *3-4.
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relevant to the resolution of any issue, substantive or procedural.”321  It found, however, 
that
it cannot be seriously contested that wealth and size ought 
not themselves be determinative of the way justice is done. 
These elements are thus legally innocuous until it appears 
that their impact is to confer undue advantage in litigation 
and promote an inequality inconsistent with the 
requirements of due process and fairness.322
The court, therefore, had “felt compelled to consider and comment upon the 
impact of defendant’s size and wealth.”323   The court found that one of the defendant’s 
most valuable weapons in this regard was its ability to hamper the plaintiff’s discovery 
efforts by claiming that documents were “lost” or “unavailable.” 324 The plaintiff in this 
situation, the court continued, thus “faces an almost impossible situation.  He needs the 
information . . . . [y]et he simply cannot afford protracted discovery.  As a practical 
matter, adequate trial preparation may become too costly. This may contribute to a 
substantial inequality before the court.”325  In the instant case, the court found that Liggett 
had “indicated an attempt to impede otherwise proper discovery.”326
The court found, additionally, that 
a party with virtually unlimited funds for litigation enjoys 
great advantages in other aspects of the preparation and 
trial of its case.  It has at its disposal all the legal manpower 
321 Id. at *4.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id. at *5.
325 Id. at *6. 
326 Id.  For example, Liggett had responded to an interrogatory questioning its membership in the Tobacco 
Institute as “not applicable” even though the court found that Liggett was in fact an Institute member.  Id.
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it feels to be necessary, in many situations, specialists in the 
subject matter of the litigation.  It has the resources to 
research, organize, and make available for instant use an 
incredible volume of factual material.  It can locate [and] 
transfer files any place in the country.  It has channels of 
communication and cooperation available to other 
interested parties.  It can bring all of this potential to bear 
on the trial of a single lawsuit.327
Not only did Liggett “enjoy[ ] all the advantages that wealth naturally produces,”
the court continued, but it sought also “to restrict plaintiff’s own flexibility in trial 
preparation. The success of this effort magnified the existing inequality of these 
parties.”328
For example, Liggett sought and obtained a “sweeping protective order . . . . 
prevent[ing] plaintiff’s counsel from revealing any information acquired through 
discovery to any other persons, with the exception of five experts.”329 Liggett claimed 
that such a protective order was necessary, first, to prevent exposure of trade secrets, and 
second, to protect the information from being given to “attorneys for other plaintiffs 
bringing similar suits” – which Liggett claimed would constitute a deprivation “of its 
rights under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”330  The court later determined, 
327 Id. at *6-7.
328 Id. at *9.  
329 Id. at *10-11.  Another example the court noted:
Early in the discovery process defendant moved to be allowed to depose plaintiff before 
submitting answers to interrogatories. The court agreed to grant priority if it appeared 
from such answers, filed with the court, that defendant had responded in good faith.
Upon initial examination of these answers it appeared that a good faith response had been 
made, and the court granted defendant’s motion. The court later discovered that 
defendant had incorrectly answered interrogatories regarding defendant’s connection with 
the Tobacco Institute and the Tobacco Industry Research Committee.
Id. at *9-10.
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however, that “the protective order was serving defendant well in areas unrelated to the 
protection of its trade secrets or legitimate procedural rights.”331  The court summarized 
that, as a result of the protective order, “the defendant, rich in resources, maintained 
complete freedom of association and consultation, including courtroom conferences with 
other attorneys experienced in the trial of similar cases . . . .”332  The plaintiff’s counsel, 
on the other hand, “already disadvantaged by the limited resources available to the[m], 
were prohibited from doing likewise by a blanket protective order obtained on grounds 
which later proved largely illusory.”333
The court then noted another “obvious advantage” to Liggett “by virtue of its 
overwhelming superiority in resources” – its knowledge “that plaintiff could not afford 
the luxury of a mistrial.”334 “With such knowledge,” the court maintained, Liggett “could 
confidently risk tactics that would normally be deterred by this sanction.”335  Plaintiff, on 
the other hand, “knew both that she had to be cautious herself and that, as a practical 
330 Id. at *11.
331 Id. at *12.
332 Id. at *16.
333 Id.  The court also found:
In addition, the order prevents discovery, in future cases, of documents which would 
normally be public records.  This, too, serves defendant well.  It makes future discovery 
for other individual plaintiffs more difficult, more time consuming, and more expensive.  
It insulates data that could be used for impeachment or other evidentiary purposes.  In 
over-all effect, it magnifies the burden any plaintiff will face in the trial of a similar 
lawsuit.  It is calculated to do so.  It has already been used for this purpose.
Id. 
334 Id. at *18.
335 Id. 
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matter, she would be unable to effectively police defendant’s conduct.  Defendant thus 
sought the best of two worlds – a mistrial or a verdict of no cause for action.”336
Although the court was “convinced that the magnitude of the impact of the 
disparity in resources between these parties, plus the sophisticated and calculated 
exploitation of the situation by the defendant, approaches a denial of due process which 
would compel the granting of a new trial,” it found the question “unfortunately . . . now 
moot because plaintiff cannot afford further proceedings.”337  If a denial of due process 
has in fact occurred,” the court concluded, “it has at this point slipped past the safeguards 
existing within the system and cannot be corrected.”338
G. Company-specific examples of the Industry’s Litigation Tactics
The Thayer case presents just one example of the tobacco industry’s secondary 
reprehensibility.  For example, in a lengthy statement, plaintiffs’ attorney Daniel G. 
Childs detailed the actions taken by a tobacco company’s attorney in two cases in which 
he was involved.339  The discovery tactics he reported witnessing include a widow being 
deposed for days with questions about dating other men subsequent to her husband’s 
336 Id. 
337 Id. at *59.  In a letter to the court, the plaintiff’s attorneys wrote: “Although we are convinced that the 
law would have entitled plaintiff to a new trial, the prohibitive costs already incurred have prevented 
further post trial options, and we are closing our file.”  Id. at n. 32
338 Id. at *59.  Similarly, in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Inc., after more than ten years of litigation a jury 
found on retrial that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of contracting lung cancer. Rabin, supra note 275, at 
862.  After the plaintiff was able to have the verdict overturned, nearly all of his resources had been 
extinguished and the case was abandoned.  Id. Indeed, the Cipollone case was abandoned after a victory in 
the United States Supreme Court for exactly the same reason.  See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 
U.S. 504 (1992), in which the Court held on June 24, 1992 that tobacco companies could be sued for 
fraudulently withholding or falsifying information on the health risks associated with smoking.  See Key 
Developments in the Tobacco Debate, Facts on File, at http://www.facts.com/wnd/tobtime.htm (last visited 
December 3, 2004).  Despite this success, however, on November 4, 1992 the Cipollones’ son consented to 
a voluntary dismissal of the case with prejudice. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F.Supp. 414, 417 
(D.N.J. 1993).
339
 Townsley, supra note 309, at 4.22.
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death, and the decedent’s daughter being questioned about information given to her 
psychiatrist.340  Childs stated that the defendant company took irrelevant depositions – in 
many different jurisdictions – of the plaintiff’s former classmates, employers and 
neighbors.341  Fights that the decedent had with his children and any possible run-ins with 
the law were sought to find any piece of dirt that existed.342 Further company-specific 
examples are given below.
1. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company
Tobacco companies often have used private investigation agencies to track down 
and interview potential witnesses.  One such agency’s efforts are documented in a 
December 10, 1973 letter written by Frank Skovold of the Barnes Investigation Agency 
in Los Angeles.343  The letter, written to an attorney at the law firm Lawler, Felix & Hall 
(“Lawler”), summarized in detail the agency’s efforts in investigating individuals 
acquainted – some quite remotely – with Dorothy Nickloff, a plaintiff  in a smoking-
related lawsuit against Lawler’s client, Liggett.344
For example, Skovold discussed his “extreme difficulty in making contact” with 
the Nickloffs’ former next door neighbor.345  When Skovold finally located and 
340 Id. at 4.22.
341 Id.
342 Id.
343
 Skovold, F.; Barnes Investigation, A.G. “Report Concerning Potential Witnesses Prepared by RJR 
Consultant in Connection with Ongoing Litigation, Providing Confidential Summary and Observations to 
RJR Outside Legal Counsel in Order to Assist in the Rendering of Legal Advice.” 10 Dec 1973. Bates: 
502642611-502642624. http://tobaccodocuments.org/bliley_rjr/502642611-2624.html.
344 See generally id.
345 Id. at 502642611.
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questioned the neighbor, the man insisted that he and the Nickloffs “were never what you 
would call close friends, just good neighbors.”346  Skovold continued his probing 
nonetheless, asking the neighbor if he remembered Mrs. Nickloff being a smoker, and 
attempting to gather information about her smoking habits.347  Although the neighbor
again insisted that “he did not know anything about [the Nickloffs’] lifestyle or what they 
are currently doing,” Skovold noted that he was “planning further personal contact” with 
the man and his wife.”348
Skovold also reported going to great lengths to locate Mrs. Nickloff’s former 
hairdresser, noting that investigators “chased [her] around the area from Inglewood to 
Culver City to Indio with negative results until finally tracing through marriage and 
divorce records and locating [her] mother and mother-in-law.”349  When Skovold met 
with the woman, she “related she [did] not remember much about Dorothy Nickloff . . . 
.”
350
  Although she could recall, after some probing from Skovold, that Mrs. Nickloff had 
smoked while the two occasionally had coffee together, she “could not tell . . . whether or 
not Mrs. Nickloff was a ‘heavy smoker.’”351 She then “reflected that she could not be of 
any further help to [the investigators] and indicated that she didn’t want to become 
involved to any greater extent than what she already has.”352
346 Id. at 502642612.
347 Id. at 502642612-13.
348 Id. at 502642613.
349 Id. 
350 Id. 
351 Id. at 502642614.
352 Id. at 502642614-15.
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The letter also details the Barnes Agency’s interviews with various other 
acquaintances of Dorothy Nickloff, including many of her former neighbors.353  The 
investigators probed these individuals for information, such as the amount Mrs. Nickloff 
had smoked, comments made to her and by her about smoking, and irrelevant details of 
the Nickloffs’ social life (according to Skovold, one former neighbor noted “that the 
Nickloffs were avid gamblers and seemed to thrive on [poker parties]”).354  With each 
former neighbor interviewed, Skovold obtained additional former neighbors’ names, 
tracking them down as far away as North Dakota.355  He even conducted an extensive 
interview with one former neighbor “whose memory was not all that good,” and who had, 
according to Skovold, “considerable difficulty remembering the names of her own 
children and to whom they were married.”356  Although obviously impaired, Skovold 
nonetheless continued to probe the woman for information about Mrs. Nickloff and the 
location of other former neighbors.357
2. Philip Morris
A 1988 document entitled “Depositions, Discovery and Investigations Position 
Statement,” attributed to Philip Morris’ Victor Han,358 states: “It is standard practice in 
353 Id. at 502642615-24.
354 Id. at 502642617.
355 Id. at 502642623.
356 Id. at 502642620.
357 Id. at 502642620-22.
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 Han was, at various time, Director of Communications for Philip Morris’ Worldwide Regulatory Affairs 
office (1993-95), directed Philip Morris strategy and implementation of internal and external 
communications, and worked for Philip Morris Corporate Affairs.  See Tobacco Documents Online, Victor 
Han Profile, at http://tobaccodocuments.org/profiles/people/han_victor.html (last visited December 3, 
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all contemporary litigation for plaintiff and defendant attorneys to seek information that 
could be pertinent in any given court case.”359  Han felt this was “especially important in 
tobacco litigation because no one really knows what causes the disease that plaintiffs 
claim resulted from cigarette smoking.”360  He cited several alternate theories, such as 
“genetics and environmental or workplace exposures . . . stress, diet, cholesterol levels or 
individual behavioral characteristics.”361  Han used these theories as justification for his 
conclusion that “the backgrounds of plaintiffs must be investigated thoroughly to 
ascertain which of these factors they encountered during the course of their lives.”362
2004), citing Glenn Frankel, Where There’s Smoke, There’s Ire; The Folks at Philip Morris Are Defensive. 
They Have to Be., WASHINGTON POST, December 26, 1996, at B01 (describing Han as Philip Morris’s 
“vice president of external relations”).
359 Han, V. “Depositions, Discovery and Investigations Position Statement.” 01 Apr 1988. Bates: 
92347681. http://tobaccodocuments.org/bliley_lor/92347681.html.
360 Id. 
361 Id.
Another memorandum, this one prepared by B&W, describes “a number of aspects of our modern 
lifestyle [associated] with cancers of various types.”  It lists “dietary deficiencies or excesses,” “[e]xcessive 
intake of alcohol,” “deficiency of Vitamin A,” and “excessive coffee drinking” as potential cancer causers.  
The memorandum suggests that “[t]hese preliminary findings provide ample justification for pursuing 
intensive investigation into the plaintiff’s lifestyle, including thorough deposition questioning of the 
plaintiff, his family and friends.”  See Law Department (Inferred) “Confidential Memorandum Prepared by 
B&W in-House Counsel, Reflecting Counsel’s Thoughts, Strategy, and Analysis of Various Legal Issues 
Confronting the Industry in Pending and Anticipated Smoking and Health Litigation.” Bates: 682002741-
682002764. http://tobaccodocuments.org/bliley_bw/682002741-2764.html at 682002782-83.
Similarly, a 1985 document also attributed to B&W describes other suspects for lung cancer, such as: 
viruses, stress, genetics, chemicals and toxic waste, diet (including “[l]ack of Vitamin A” and “[l]ack of 
saturated fats or excess of polyunsaturated fats in the diet”), radiation/chest x-rays, the aging process, 
suppression of the immune system, and prior tuberculosis lesions.  The list even includes such far-fetched 
suspects as month of birth, marital status, and climate. See Chadbourne & Parke. “Confidental [sic] Draft 
Outline of Causation Issues in Lung Cancer Defense Prepared by B&W Outside Counsel and Forwarded to 
B&W in-House Counsel Reflecting Counsel’s Thoughts and Legal Opinion Regarding These Issues in 
Connection with Pending Litigation.” 08 Oct 1985. Bates: 282008798-282008815. 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/bliley_bw/282008798-8815.html at 282008811-15.
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It is important to note that Han’s suggestion came nearly 25 years after the first 
Surgeon General’s report in 1964363 – which marked “the first official recognition in the 
United States that cigarette smoking causes cancer and other serious diseases.”364
Similarly, the “Purpose of Investigation” section of a 1992 Philip Morris 
document entitled “International Product Liability Conference 11/12-13/1992” lists
several reasons for conducting thorough investigations, including: “[l]earn as much as we 
can about the plaintiff’s background including family history, health, smoking history, 
awareness of the claimed risks of smoking, lifestyle, employment and other information 
which may be related in any way to the issues in the case.”365  The document instructs
investigators to interview the plaintiff’s co-workers, supervisors, neighbors, friends, 
relatives, schoolmates, teachers, and athletic coaches.366  The document advises, further, 
that investigators should “[v]isit and observe the sites where plaintiff lived and worked 
… [d]etermine if there is any pollution, toxic waste dump or other possible health 
hazard.”367
363 See “1964 Surgeon General Report: Reducing the Health Consequences of Smoking,” at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/sgr_1964/sgr64.htm (last visited December 3, 2004).
364 See “40th Anniversary of the First Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking and Health,” MMWR 
Weekly, at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5303a1.htm (last visited December 3, 
2004).
365
“International Product Liability Conference 11/12-13/1992.” 01 Nov 1992. Bates: 2501196322-
2501196529. http://tobaccodocuments.org/bliley_pm/27390.html at 2501196352.  Mindful, likely, of how 
this document might appear, the author added that the investigation’s purpose was “[n]ot to harass, 
intimidate or embarrass the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s family or friends.”  Id.
366 Id. at 2501196360.
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Another Philip Morris document, entitled “Outline of Presentation to Board of 
Directors: Post-Cipollone Strategies,”368 provides “a general overview of the steps which 
the Company will take in response to a decision by the Supreme Court in Cipollone [v. 
Liggett Group, Inc.].”369  Among other things, the outline articulates one of the “central 
elements” involved in Philip Morris’ strategy: to “continue a rigorous defense of all 
smoking and health cases.”370  The outline notes Philip Morris’ “long-standing strategy 
for litigating smoking and health cases – vigorous defense of cases on an individual basis 
in which the smoker’s free and informed decision to smoke is a primary issue.”371
The outline notes Philip Morris’s intent “to continue to defend claims on a case by 
case basis” regardless of the Supreme Court’s decision in Cipollone.372 “This strategy,”
the outline continues, “entails a rigorous factual investigation of such issues as the 
smoker’s awareness of claims concerning the risks of smoking, family medical history, 
employment history, as well as the smoker’s medical history.”373  These facts “often 
present a basis for dismissal prior to trial and, at a trial, a basis for a defense verdict.”374
368
“Outline of Presentation to Board of Directors: Post-Cipollone Strategies [Confidential draft].” No date. 
Bates: 2023005424-2023005447.  http://tobaccodocuments.org/tplp/2023005424-5447.html.
369 Id. at 2023005424, discussing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
370 Outline of Presentation to Board of Directors, supra note 368, at 2023005424.
371 Id. at 2023005428.  A Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue memorandum similarly discusses the smoker’s 
decision-making process, noting the value of “establish[ing] that claims that tobacco usage involved 
deleterious health consequences have been made since colonial times.” Reavis & Pogue; Jones; Day. 
“Smoking and Health Litigation – Tactical Proposals.” 10 Aug 1985. Bates: 680712261-680712337. 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/ness/38741.html at 680712266-2337. Proving this, the memorandum 
continues, “helps establish that the unsullied innocent youth naively tempted into original sin by the 
tobacco companies is a non-existent figure, but the price involved suggesting awareness of actual hazard at 
a time the companies were making express safety and health claims.”  Id.
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Furthermore, the outline assures that even the successful plaintiff would not 
receive his or her damages award for a protracted period following judgment.  First, the 
outline states that if a jury awards damages to a plaintiff, Philip Morris “would have a 
basis for successfully appealing such a verdict.”375 Furthermore, the outline promises
that “[i]n any event, the appellate process is relatively slow and there may be a gap of 
several years between the entry of a jury verdict and the actual payment of damages.”376
3. Brown & Williamson
B&W’s 1982 “Training Materials for Counsel in Smoking and Health Litigation”
justifies “[t]he most thorough possible background investigation of the plaintiff, his 
family, friends, employment history, etc.”377  This document claims that such an 
investigation is necessary to support what it calls the tobacco industry’s “strongest 
defense”: focusing on the “specific plaintiff” rather than on “the general proposition that 
cigarette smoking causes disease.”378
Similarly, in a memorandum entitled “Smoking and Health Litigation Tactical 
Proposals,” industry law firm Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue (“Jones Day”) detailed to 
B&W its proposed strategy for “blunt[ing] the plaintiff’s anticipated attacks on corporate 
conduct while keeping the focus of each case on the particular plaintiff and his choices . . 
374 Id.
375 Id. at 2023005424.
376 Id.
377 Training Materials, supra note 292, at 282011027
378 Id.
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. .”
379
  The memorandum notes that it is “strategically essential for the defendants to win 
this battle over the central focus of the case.”380
This strategy, the memorandum states, involves “controlling and creating a 
defense-oriented pretrial record,” which “requires the traditional taking of extensive 
depositions of plaintiffs and their family members, friends, neighbors and business 
associates, and, as a general rule, their experts and treating physicians.”381  These 
depositions, the memorandum continues, “must attempt to go beyond discovery and 
should be admission-oriented.  Such admissions . . . will enable the defense to keep the 
focus on the plaintiff at trial.”382
Notably, in addition to building its defense by gathering information about the 
plaintiff, the memorandum advises that “ [t]he taking of extensive admission-oriented 
depositions” would have an added benefit: “impress[ing] upon the plaintiffs, their 
lawyers, and their experts the seriousness of the commitment they must make in bringing 
these cases.”383  In other words, the memorandum made it abundantly clear that any 
plaintiffs who choose to take B&W to task would face a rigorous and costly battle.
4. R.J. Reynolds
A 1987 document entitled “Smoking and Health Litigation Integrated Exposure 
and Hazard Assessment Initiative,” authored for Reynolds by its outside counsel, the law 
379
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firm Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice,384 claims “it has become apparent that 
occupational and/or environmental exposure represents the kernel of an alternative 
causation initiative.”385  The memorandum proposes that, in response, the tobacco 
industry has a critical need to gather “information the plaintiffs do not [have]” and to 
“[i]ntimidate plaintiff’s experts who will not be effectively able to counteract the precise 
nature of our testimony.”386
Galbraith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (“Galbraith”) provides a case-
specific example of Reynolds’ litigation tactics.387 Galbraith, a personal injury action 
tried in Santa Barbara, California on behalf of smoker John Galbraith (“Galbraith”)388
and his wife in 1985, was “the first cigarette product liability case to come to trial in over 
twenty-five years.”389 According to Galbraith’s attorney, Paul Monzione,390 Reynolds 
initially sent subpoenas to “all of Mr. Galbraith’s former employers back to the time that 
[he] was a very young man,” and demanded documents from the plaintiff such as 
384
 “Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice is a law firm in Winston-Salem, NC.  They are North Carolina’s 
biggest law firm and represent R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company.”  Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice 
Profile, Tobacco Documents Online, at
http://tobaccodocuments.org/profiles/people/womble_carlyle_sandridge_rice.html (last visited December 3, 
2004) (internal citation omitted).
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 Mackintosh, B.A.; Womble Carlyle. “Draft Report Prepared by RJR Outside Legal Counsel for the 
Purpose of Providing Confidential Information in Order to Assist in the Rendering of Legal Advice in 
Connection with Ongoing Litigation, Containing Analyses Concerning Litigation.” 20 Jan 1987. Bates: 
507916450-507916480. http://tobaccodocuments.org/bliley_rjr/507916450-6480.html at 507916451.
386 Id. at 507916453-54.
387 See Townsley, supra note 309, at 4.22.
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 Monzione prepared a sworn statement discussing his experience in litigating the Galbraith case.  This 
statement appears in Appendix A to Townsley, supra note 309, at 4.22-4.24.
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Christmas cards, family diaries, phone logs, and lists of attendees at the family’s 
weddings and birthdays.391  After obtaining this documentary evidence, Reynolds “began 
noticing depositions and subpoenaing witnesses for depositions virtually all over the 
United States.”392  Those deposed included “anyone and everyone remotely connected 
with Plaintiff, including childhood friends, former spouses, former spouses of family 
members, neighbors and store owners in the neighborhood where Plaintiff lived.”393  The 
depositions “would last for hours, and very little, if any relevant or admissible evidence 
would be obtained.”394 Galbraith’s wife was deposed for ten days; his mother for several 
days.395 According to Monzione, Reynolds justified the depositions by arguing that they 
needed to obtain information such as whether Galbraith “ate red meat, or used pesticides 
in his garden . . . .”396
Monzione, however, felt that such discovery is “obviously designed to harass 
plaintiffs and make these cases more costly than they need to be.”397 Monzione stated, 
furthermore, that despite Reynolds ’ “burdensome and unreasonable discovery,” the 
company “object[ed] to the vast majority of interrogatories propounded by Plaintiff, and 
caus[ed] Plaintiff to file motions to compel discovery responses.”398  The court granted 
391 Id. at 4.23.
392 Id.
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 Id.
396 Id.
397 Id.
398 Id.
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most of these motions, but “only after great time, inconvenience, and expense.”399
Monzione concluded astutely that plaintiffs cannot bring tobacco cases cost effectively 
“if defendants and their counsel are allowed to engage in what is obviously an approach 
designed to dissuade and deter plaintiffs from bringing other cases and to force plaintiffs 
to dismiss these cases rather than try them.”400
In the end, Reynolds’ scorched earth discovery tactics efforts paid off.  After a 
trial at which Reynolds had “eight attorneys sitting at the defense table or directly behind 
it [during closing arguments] and several public relations representatives in Santa 
Barbara, along with a troop of paralegal aides, secretaries and office assistants,” the jury 
rejected Galbraith’s claims in December 1985, voting 9 to 3 that Reynolds was not liable 
for his death.401  According to the jury foreperson, although the jury majority “agreed that 
smoking is harmful . . . that it is bad for you,” it found “in this case, the evidence just 
wasn’t there.”402
5. General Cigar & Tobacco Co.
The tobacco industry’s litigation tactics stretch beyond cigarette manufacturers 
alone.  For example, the Wall Street Journal reported the story of Dollie Root, a 73 year-
old widow whose husband died of congestive heart failure and lung cancer.403  Root sued 
General Cigar & Tobacco Co., whose pipe tobacco her husband had smoked, claiming 
399 Id.
400 Id...
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that “tobacco was far more toxic than any warning had suggested” and that “General 
Cigar knew of the dangers . . .  but didn’t do anything to warn its customers.”404
After a two-year legal battle, however, Root found herself unable to continue 
enduring “grueling interrogations by the tobacco-company lawyers, who spent days 
grilling her on such topics as her infertility and her adopted son’s suicide a year ago.”405
Saying she was “far too old to spend the rest of her life answering to a tobacco 
company,” Root dropped her suit.406  This, unfortunately, is typical of smoking and 
health cases: the tobacco industry’s tactics have made the cost of litigation so high that 
most plaintiffs are forced to drop their cases before trial.407
G. Inability to Obtain Counsel
In addition to those plaintiffs whose litigation efforts have been frustrated or 
ruined by the tobacco industry’s litigation tactics during the course of their cases, there 
are an unknowable number of potential plaintiffs whose claims never see the light of day 
due to the scarcity of lawyers willing to take on the industry.  For example, one long-time 
smoker who contracted lung cancer reportedly contacted 14 lawyers regarding a potential 
suit, but was told the same thing by each one: “They don’t do tobacco litigation.”408
Although it may seem foolish for attorneys to pass on cases worth, potentially, 
multiple millions of dollars, such attorney hesitancy is understandable in the context of 
404 Id.
405 Id.
406 Id.
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smoking and health litigation.  Although the major United States tobacco companies 
entered into the Master Settlement Agreement requiring them to paying out over $200 
billion, 409 “the industry’s generosity appears to begin and end with the government 
lawsuits.”410  As detailed above, the companies continually have refused to settle 
individual and class action cases, employing their “old – and extremely successful –
litigation tactics.”411 Consequently, such cases against the industry “remain almost 
unwinnable.”412 As one attorney put it, “I don’t know if there’s a tougher case to win in 
the country.”413
409
 On November 23, 1998, forty-six states, five commonwealths and territories, and the District of 
Columbia:
entered into a twenty five year, $206 billion Master Settlement Agreement (“MSA”) with 
Philip Morris, Inc., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Lorillard Tobacco Corp., and 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.  The tobacco companies were required to pay a $10 billion
lump sum cash payment up front, and then to make base annual payments for twenty-five 
years, subject to inflation protection and volume adjustments (the “Industry Payments”).  
From the Industry Payments, an aggressive federal enforcement program would be 
created, including a state administered retail licensing system to stop minors from 
obtaining tobacco products.  Enforcement of federal restrictions on smoking in public
places would be funded from the Industry Payments, as would a $500 million annual, 
national education-oriented counter advertising and tobacco control campaign seeking to 
discourage children from starting to smoke and to encourage current smokers to quit 
smoking.  The agreement also authorized the annual payment to all states of significant, 
ongoing financial compensation from Industry Payments to fund health benefits program 
expenditures and to establish and fund a tobacco products liability judgments and
settlement fund.  In addition, the tobacco companies agreed to go beyond current 
regulations to ban all outdoor advertising and to eliminate cartoon characters and human 
figures such as Joe Camel and the Marlboro Man from advertisements.
Philip C. Patterson & Jennifer M. Philpott, In Search of a Smoking Gun: A Comparison of Public Entity 
Tobacco and Gun Litigation, 66 Brooklyn L. Rev. 549, 553-54 (2000) (internal citations omitted).  For the 
MSA’s full text, see Tobacco Control Resource Center and The Tobacco Products Liability Project, at
http://tobacco.neu.edu/tobacco_control/resources/msa/multistate_settlement.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2004).
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For lawyers taking cases on a contingency fee basis, as an estimated greater than 
95 percent of all personal injury cases are taken,414 representing plaintiffs in claims 
against the industry simply is not economically feasible for most attorneys.  This leaves 
legions of potential plaintiffs suffering from smoking-related illnesses, as well as the 
families of smokers who have died from such illnesses, without the ability to bring their 
suits.
H. Motions
In addition to conducting extensive investigations, interviews, and depositions, 
the tobacco industry has engaged in the practice of filing countless pretrial motions aimed 
at either getting the plaintiff’s case dismissed or excluding crucial evidence prior to trial.  
One internal industry document, the Jones Day-authored memorandum entitled 
“Smoking and Health Litigation Tactical Proposals” discussed above,415 instructs that “it 
is critical to file a series of motions in limine before each trial.”416  The memorandum 
discusses that in addition to the “genuine substantive advantage to be gained” from 
successful motions, there is a “slight tactical advantage found in forcing plaintiff’ s 
counsel, on the eve of trial, to respond to such motions and to formulate alternative trial 
strategies in the event that any of defendants’ motions are granted.”417 Notably, Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 11 prohibits filing motions for “an improper purpose, such 
414
 Robert E. Thomas, Psychological Impact of Scrutiny on Contingent Fee Attorney Effort, 101 W. Va. L. 
Rev. 327, 328 n. 4 (1998).  “Lawyers charge standard contingent fees in all personal injury litigation 
ranging from 33 1/3 to 50 percent depending on the jurisdiction.” Lester Brickman, The Market For 
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as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.”418
Doing so subjects the offending attorneys, law firms, or parties to sanction.419
The Jones Day memorandum goes on to list nine possible motion subjects, 
including a “motion to exclude all evidence relating to defendants’ conduct prior to the 
publication of the Surgeon General’s 1964 Report and/or the 1966 warnings,”420 “a 
motion to limit evidence relating to advertising to [those] advertisements of brands of 
cigarettes that plaintiff/decedent relied upon in choosing to smoke the brands 
advertised,”421 and a “motion to exclude evidence of additives and/or constituents in 
tobacco smoke to the extent that we can obtain admissions on deposition that 
plaintiff’s/decedent’s injury cannot be attributed to such additives or constituents.”422
418 FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
419 Id.
420
 To view all past Surgeon General’s Reports on smoking and health, see Surgeon General’s 
Reports Tobacco That Are Available On-Line, Information and Prevention Source (TIPS) website, 
at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/index.htm (last visited December 3, 2004).  
The Jones Day memorandum’s convoluted reason for such a motion are as follows:
The argument in support of such a motion would depend upon obtaining admissions by 
the plaintiff’s expert(s) on deposition that after 15 years of not smoking, one’s claimed 
risk of getting lung cancer or heart disease is virtually equal to that of a non-smoker and 
that had one quit smoking in 1964 when the Surgeon General’s Report was published, or 
in 1966, when warning labels appeared, the contraction of lung cancer in 1980 or 
thereafter could not be attributed to smoking to any degree of reasonable medical 
certainty.  Given the appropriate admissions – which are based on the very reports to be 
relied on by Plaintiff’s experts – the only activity that can be proximately related to 
plaintiff’s injury is plaintiff’s decision to continue to smoke in the face of widespread 
publicity of the alleged adverse health consequences of smoking from 1964 on. Thus, 
assuming arguendo that the tobacco companies actually knew of any health risks prior to 
1964 and concealed them or attempted to neutralize them through advertising it is legally 
immaterial to plaintiff’s alleged failure to warn because had plaintiff quit in 1964 or 
1966, any illness contracted in the 1980’s could not be said to have been caused by the 
pre-1964/66 smoking. 
Reavis & Pogue, supra note 371, at 680712281-82.
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In addition to being burdensome and expensive for plaintiffs to file briefs in 
defense of the tobacco industry’s various motions, the hearings on these motions give the 
industry’s lawyers an opportunity to intimidate plaintiff’s counsel by demonstrating what 
has been called a “wall of flesh.”  According plaintiffs’ attorney Daniel G. Childs, “[y]ou 
go into court alone to argue some really insignificant motion on a case and 30 lawyers 
show up for the other side.”423
Even if the defendant files its motions in good faith (and not in violation of Rule 
11), the fact remains that the tobacco industry, unlike most plaintiffs, has the money to 
finance the drafting and arguing of multiple motions on a plethora of issues.  By doing so, 
the tobacco industry forces the plaintiff to spend his or her money in defense of the 
motions.  As J. Michael Jordan stated in the famous “General Patton” memorandum, 
forcing the plaintiff to spend all of his (or her) money before the case reaches trial is one 
effective way for the defendant industry to win cases against it – without ever having to 
defend itself on the merits.424
I. Document Destruction/Hiding/Failure to Produce
Many of the litigation tactics described above can be considered to fall under a 
lawyer’s professional duty to “act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the 
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”425 The tobacco industry’s 
litigation tactics, however, have at times gone beyond the boundaries of what is proper, 
and into the realm of unacceptable and unprofessional conduct.  As the Model Rules of 
422
 Reavis & Pogue, supra note 371, at 680712281; 83-84.  
423
 Gray, supra note 277.
424 See Jordan Memo, supra note 3. 
 
425 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt (2003).
82
Professional Conduct caution, the “lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable diligence does 
not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in 
the legal process with courtesy and respect.”426  Furthermore, lawyers may not 
“unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or 
conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value.”427 The 
industry’s long history of lawyer-sanctioned document destruction – a glaring example of 
this type of improper conduct – thus deserves review.
One well-documented example of the tobacco industry’s document destruction 
practices, and a court’s reaction to these practices, is the recent Australian case McCabe 
v. British American Tobacco Australia Services, Ltd. 428 In that case, the trial court found 
that British American Tobacco Australia Services, Ltd. (“BATAS”)429 had destroyed key 
documents that could work against its interests in future smoking and health litigation.  
Although these documents were destroyed at a time when there was no active litigation 
against the company, the judge felt nonetheless that the destruction “was conducted in 
anticipation that further litigation would soon arise.”430  The judge was incensed 
especially by BATAS’ destruction of CD-ROM discs on which a large number of 
documents were imaged, finding “[t]here was no factor of storage space which caused 
426 Id.
427 Id. at R. 3.4 (a).
428 McCabe v. British American Tobacco Services, Ltd. (2002) 73 V.S. Ct. 73 (Sup. Ct. of Victoria at 
Melbourne March 22, 2002) (Austl.) (17.1 TOB. PROD. LITIG. RPTR. 2.1).
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430 McCabe, 73 V.S. Ct. ¶ 288.
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that.”431  The judge concluded that the “decision to destroy [documents] could only have 
been a deliberate tactic designed to hide information as to what was destroyed,”432 and 
that BATAS “intended that . . . any plaintiff in [the same position] would be prejudiced. . 
. .  It was intended by the defendant that any such plaintiff would be denied a fair 
trial.”433
The court responded by “striking out” BATAS’ entire defense – the equivalent of 
entering a default judgment against it.434 Although the case was overturned on appeal,435
the trial court’s decision “was a significant development in Australian smoking and 
health litigation, and marked an important moment for global tobacco litigation.”436
Evidence of document destruction at the major United States tobacco companies 
abounds in the companies’ internal documents.437  For example:
• A note handwritten around 1970 and attributed Dr. Alan F. Rodgman, then head
of the Smoke Research Section at Reynolds,438 concerning Dr. Clifford 
431 Id. ¶ 160.
432 Id.
433 Id. ¶ 289.  The judge also found that prior to destroying the Cremona database in 1998, BATAS had 
destroyed other documents in anticipation of litigation, but “[w]hat those documents were is now not 
known or not disclosed.”  Id. ¶ 100.
434 Id. ¶ 385.  
435 British American Tobacco Australia Service Ltd. v. Cowell (as representing the estate of Rolah Ann 
McCabe, deceased), (2002) 197 VSCA (C.A. of Sup. Ct. of Victoria at Melbourne Dec. 6, 2002) (Austl.) 
(17.7 TOB. PROD. LITIG. RPTR. 2.504).
436
 Sara D. Guardino et al., Remedies for Document Destruction: Tales from the Tobacco Wars, 12.1 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 3 (2004).
437 Id. at 25-43.
438 See Tobacco Documents Online, Alan F. Rodgman Profile, at
http://tobaccodocuments.org/profiles/people/rodgman_alan.html (last visited December 3, 2004).
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Chappel, director of Bioresearch Laboratories of Quebec, Canada,439 states: 
“Legal ramifications . . . . Destroyed reports or letters for legal reasons – he has 
only copy – leave it up to Chappel to destroy letters.”440
• A 1969 memorandum from Murray Senkus, a Reynolds chemist who 
ultimately became its Director of Scientific Affairs,441 to Reynolds 
General Counsel Max H. Crohn442 states: “We do not foresee any 
difficulty in the event a decision is reached to remove certain reports 
from Research files.  Once it becomes clear that such action is necessary 
for the successful defense of our present and future suits, we will 
promptly remove all such reports from our files.”443
• A 1970 memorandum between BAT attorneys T.E. Davies and E.G. 
Langford states: “You might, perhaps, suggest that files in BAT and 
Louisville be gone through (the latter, presumably, have already 
received attention) so that any offending documents are removed 
therefrom . . . .”444
• An undated handwritten memorandum attributed to Thomas Osdene, 
Philip Morris’ Director of Research,445 instructs bluntly: “Ok to phone 
439 See Deposition of Robert H. Aronson in Washington v. American Tobacco Co. 17 Nov 1998. 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/datta/ARONSONR111798.html at ARONSONR111798 (identifying 
Chappel).
440
 “Chappel.” No date. Bates: 500523296. 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/youth/LgToRJR00000000.No.html.  See also Jones Day. “Report Containing 
Analyses Concerning Research Development Activities Prepared by RJR Outside Legal Counsel to Assist 
in the Rendering of Legal Advice in Connection with Ongoing Litigation.” 31 Dec 1985. Bates: 
515871651-515872176. 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/bliley_rjr/515871651-2176.html at 515872005 (attributing this note to 
Rodgman, and stating Rodgman believes “it was probably written in February, 1970).
441 See Tobacco Documents Online, Murray Senkus Profile, at
http://tobaccodocuments.org/profiles/people/senkus_murray.html (last visited December 3, 2004).
442 See Tobacco Documents Online, Max H. Crohn Profile, at
http://tobaccodocuments.org/profiles/people/crohn_max_h.html (last visited December 3, 2004).
443
 Senkus, Murray. “Memorandum Concerning Scientific Reports Prepared by RJR Scientist Working on 
Behalf of the Legal Department Legal Counsel for the Purpose of Providing Confidential Information to 
Assist in the Rendering of Legal Advice and Concerning Activities Performed on Behalf of the Legal 
Department.” 18 Dec 1969. Bates: 500284499. http://tobaccodocuments.org/bliley_rjr/500284499.html.
444
 Davies, T.E. “Note for Mr. Langford - Smoking and Health.” 10 Nov 1970. Bates: 202315515-
202315516. http://tobaccodocuments.org/ness/41332.html.
445 See Tobacco Documents Online, Thomas Stefan Osdene, Ph.D. Profile, at
http://tobaccodocuments.org/profiles/people/osdene_thomas.html (last visited December 3, 2004).
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& telex (these will be destroyed). . . . If important letters or documents 
have to be sent please send to home – I will act on them and destroy.” 446
• A facsimile coversheet from a public relations firm to Ned Leary, 
Reynolds’ Senior Brand Manager” states: “Ned – As we discussed . . . 
This is what I’m going to destroy . . . . under our current scrutiny, a wise 
move to rid ourselves of developmental work!!”447
The tobacco companies not only have destroyed documents; they also have made 
efforts to prevent plaintiffs from discovering physically available documents.  One 
industry document, a 1989 memorandum prepared for Reynolds by outside counsel R.G. 
Stuhan, reveals Reynolds’ tactic regarding the amount of documents it would produce in 
a number of then-ongoing cases in Texas.448  Specifically, the document discusses 
Reynolds’ “damage-control” strategy in light of several appearances before a judge 
sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ cases.449  Following these appearances, Reynolds’ lawyers 
negotiated with plaintiffs’ counsel concerning their “sweeping requests for 
production.”450  The company’s lawyers agreed to make available “the documents which 
had been produced and selected . . .  in New Jersey . . . on or before October 22, 1986.”451
However, and likely unbeknownst to plaintiffs’ counsel, this limitation was significant, 
“as the overwhelming majority of significant documents were not produced and selected 
446
 Osdene, Thomas. “Osdene (of PM): ‘I will act on them and destroy.’” No date. 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/183546.html.
447
 Morrissey, Mark. “[Re: Destruction of Documents].” 01 Nov 1991. Bates: 507647971-507647975. 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/youth/AmRJR19911101.Lt.html at 507647971.
448 See Stuhan, R.G. “Correspondence Concerning Litigation Matter Prepared by RJR Outside Legal 
Counsel Providing Confidential Information to Assist in Anticipation of Litigation and Transmitted to 
RJR Outside Legal Counsel.” 14 Feb 1989. Bates: 515708694-515708729. 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/bliley_rjr/515708694-8729.html
449 Id. at 515708703.
450 Id.
451 Id.
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in New Jersey until after that date.”452  This is just one of many examples of the way the 
industry has used its cunning to keep important documents out of plaintiffs’ hands.453
The battle for industry documents came to a head in Minnesota ex rel. Humphrey 
v. Philip Morris, Inc. (the “Minnesota case”).454  In that case, “Minnesota set out on a 
determined discovery quest” despite many observers’ belief “that virtually no new 
discovery was needed . . . .”455 The tobacco industry at “first offered to comply with its
discovery obligations by producing in Minnesota only those documents they had 
previously disclosed in litigation elsewhere.”456 Minnesota, however, refused this 
offer.457  Its belief that more documents existed proved correct, as it eventually 
“compel[led] the production of approximately thirty-five million pages of documents
from all defendants.”458
To obtain these documents, Minnesota had “to engage in an unprecedented effort  
. . . . From the beginning, the industry fought disclosure at every turn.”459 For example, 
452 Id.  
453 See also, e.g., Townsley, supra note 309, at 4.23 (attorney Paul Monzione’s remark that after the 
defendant tobacco company had received all possible information about the plaintiff, it fought plaintiff’s 
every effort to conduct its own discovery).
454 See Minnesota ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 394331 at *9, (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. May 8, 1998) (Consent Judgment).
455 Michael V. Ciresi et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota Tobacco Litigation, 
25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 477, 489 (1999).
456 Id.
457 Id.
458 Id.  “These documents are now in two document depositories, one in Minneapolis (for the domestic 
defendants) and the other in Guildford, England (for the BAT Group defendants).”  Id.  Prior to the 
Minnesota case, “the tobacco companies had produced only several million pages of documents, virtually 
all after 1981.”  Id.
459 Id. at 489-90.
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while Minnesota “was forced to bring countless motions to compel,” the “[i]ndustry 
lawyers played endless word games, claiming they did not know what documents were at 
issue.”460
One of the most significant results of Minnesota’s efforts was its exposure of the 
tobacco industry’s lawyer -directed strategy “of withholding important information on the 
health hazards of smoking under improper claims of attorney-client privilege and work 
product protection.”461 Consequently, “[a]fter extended and intense litigation, more than 
twenty trial court orders, and more than five appeals, the industry’s carefully-built wall of 
secrecy crumbled and more than 39,000 documents withheld on claims of privilege were 
produced.”462
VI. CONCLUSION
The industry’s primary reprehensibility is well-documented.  As the courts in the 
Henley and Williams cases recognized, the tobacco industry has, among other things,
“sold a product that it knew would cause death or serious injury to its customers when 
they used it as defendant intended them to use it,” while at the same time “engag[ing] in 
an extensive campaign to convince smokers that the issue of cigarette safety was
460 Id. at 490.
The lawyers claimed, for example, that they did not know what the following terms 
meant in Minnesota’s document requests: (1) “smoking and health”; (2) “the properties 
and effects . . . of nicotine”; (3) “addictive”; (4) “target levels of nicotine in cigarettes”; 
(5) “minimum dose levels of nicotine”; (6) “safer cigarettes”; (7) “advertising, marketing 
or promotion of cigarettes”; (8) “the effects of cigarette advertising”; (9) “the 
effectiveness of warning labels”; (10) “sociology or psychology of smokers”; (11) 
“antitrust issues in the tobacco industry”; and (12) “document destruction policies.”
Id.
461 Id. at 499.
462 Id. at 499-500.
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unresolved.”   Such primary reprehensibility warrants large punitive damages awards, 
even ones that are greater than nine times the compensatory damages amount.
The tobacco industry’s secondary reprehensibility likewise demands large 
punitive damages awards.  The industry long has employed “scorched earth” litigation 
tactics designed to intimidate, embarrass, and bankrupt plaintiffs in smoking and health 
litigation.  This presents a David versus Goliath battle for each plaintiff, who must face 
an uphill fight against its larger, wealthier opponent.  Additionally, while the tobacco 
industry’s battle centers on its business practices, the plaintiff’s battle is a personal one.  
As a result, many are deterred from bringing claims against the companies whose 
products have caused their own illness or their family member’s death.  Of those willing 
to bring suit, a countless number are faced with an inability to find an attorney willing to 
represent them.  Those that do then are faced with fighting the difficult battle described 
above: an onslaught of interviews of family, friends, neighbors, and remote
acquaintances; countless lengthy depositions; inability to obtain key documents; and 
superfluous pretrial motions.
If, despite all this, the plaintiff does not withdraw the case before it reaches trial, 
the tobacco industry still is able to capitalize on its unequal power by engaging in trial
strategies that approach the line of propriety.  This risk is well worth it for the industry.  
As the Thayer court found, knowing “that plaintiff could not afford the luxury of a 
mistrial,” the defendant can “confidently risk tactics that would normally be deterred by 
this sanction.”463 Furthermore, as evidence by the cases discussed above, even the 
463 Thayer v. Liggett Myers Inc., No. 5314, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12796, *18 (W.D. Mich., Feb. 20, 
1970).
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plaintiff who meets success at trial often faces a protracted appeals process.464  As a 
result, the tobacco industry has made payments to only two smoking and health plaintiffs 
over the course of its nearly 400 year history.
Therefore, in the rare instance that a smoking and health plaintiff is able to find an 
attorney, withstand the industry’s onslaught of personal and financial attacks throughout 
the discovery process, obtain a judgment in its favor at trial and hold on to that judgment 
throughout the appeals process, it is imperative that the industry be compelled to pay a 
large punitive damages award.  Only then will punitive damages fulfill their intended role 
of punishing the tobacco industry’s “aggravated or outrageous misconduct” and deterring 
the industry from similar conduct in the future.465
464 See, e.g. supra Section IV (A), discussing the U.S. Supreme Court appeal in Henley; supra Section IV 
(B), discussing the Oregon Supreme Court appeal in Williams; and supra note 279, discussing the U.S. 
Supreme Court appeals in Carter and Kenyon.
465
 Shields, supra note 7. 
 
